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For people of influence in any walk of life, from corporate leaders to sports 
stars, the question of when to leave the stage is a crucial one. Do you go out 
at the top of your game, giving up any shot at further glory? Or do you dig 
in until the end, at the risk of tarnishing a distinguished career?1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of the United States provides that the judges of courts 
that exercise the judicial power of the United States are entitled to office for 
life, subject only to a requirement of “good Behaviour,” with a compensa-
tion “which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”2 
In order to safeguard the independence of the federal judiciary, the Founders 
specified that, once appointed, a federal judge could be removed from office 
only by impeachment for and conviction of “Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.”3 
 
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
3 Id. art. II, § 4. 
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During the first eighty years of the national government, there were 
three ways to leave the federal bench: removal following conviction after 
trial on articles of impeachment, resignation, and death. None of them 
entitled the judge (or his heirs) to any financial benefits. There was no 
provision for retirement or disability. Today, federal judges can still resign 
without financial benefit or remain in regular active service until death. 
Since 1869, however, Congress has recognized that the country’s interest in 
an experienced and effective national judiciary is best served by providing 
judges with additional alternatives. Initially, the only other alternative was 
retirement with an annuity after substantial service and attainment of a 
specified age. More recently, Congress added the alternative of service in 
senior status—retaining the office but, at the judge’s option, taking a 
decreased workload, again after substantial service and attainment of a 
specified age.4 Like resignation and retirement, taking senior status creates a 
vacancy on the judge’s court, enabling the President to appoint another 
individual to serve on that court. 
Judges who retain the office, either by remaining in regular active ser-
vice or by taking senior status, are subject to a number of restraints on their 
activities imposed by statute or by the Code of Conduct for United States 
Judges, restraints that are not applicable to citizens generally. These include 
a prohibition against the practice of law, specified limits on outside income, 
and restrictions on various types of public service activities and most types 
of political activity. A retired judge relinquishes the office and as a conse-
quence, like a judge who resigns, is not subject to any of the restraints 
applicable to serving judges. 
The research underlying this article was inspired in part by a study of 
resignations from the federal bench conducted for the National Commission 
on Judicial Discipline and Removal, which Congress created in 1990 and on 
which two of the authors served as appointed members.5 As part of its 
research program, the Commission secured an analysis of all resignations 
from the federal bench between 1789 and 1992, with the goal of determin-
ing, among other things, which of them were effectively involuntary because 
they occurred in the shadow of threatened impeachment or criminal 
 
4 For the history of the statutory provisions governing retirement, senior status, and disabil-
ity, see infra Part I. 
5 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 
i-v (1993); see also Stephen B. Burbank & S. Jay Plager, Foreword: The Law of Federal Judicial 
Discipline and the Lessons of Social Science, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-10 (1993) (describing the origins, 
statutory mandate, and research program of the Commission). 
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prosecution.6 The Commission did not address, however, what paths judges 
have taken when given a voluntary choice to remain in regular active service 
or, if eligible, to serve in senior status or retire. 
The research underlying this article was also inspired by our recognition 
that, almost twenty years after the Commission issued its report, the 
judiciary confronts new challenges. Federal judicial caseloads have risen 
dramatically, and the number of Article III judges in regular active service 
and the compensation those judges receive have not kept pace with the 
workload or inflation. These developments may have adverse consequences 
for the institution, and recent economic conditions have exacerbated 
budgetary pressures already exerted by Congress on the institutional 
judiciary.  
Taking account of these developments, we determined that it would be 
useful to bring the Commission’s work on judicial resignations up to date 
and to take a broader look at the tenure of federal judges and the influences 
that affect it. For that purpose we chose to study the choices federal judges 
have made in the period from 1970 through 2009. Because the Supreme 
Court has been studied extensively, and because the Justices are subject to 
somewhat different rules and have somewhat different incentives for 
remaining on or departing from the bench, we focused our research on the 
judges who serve or have served on federal district and circuit courts. 
Thus, one goal of the research on which this Article is based has been to 
examine the reasons why, for the last four decades, some federal judges have 
decided to resign—leave the bench before becoming eligible for an 
annuity—and why, among those eligible through age and service, some have 
elected to remain in regular active service, while others have chosen one or 
another (sometimes more than one) of the available alternatives—service in 
senior status and retirement. 
These decisions have personal consequences for the individuals who 
make them, but they also have consequences, perhaps far-reaching, for the 
institution of the judiciary and for the society as a whole. Thus, another 
goal of our study has been to identify what those consequences are or may be. 
This article is organized in six parts. Part I reviews the historical devel-
opment of the statutory scheme governing the choices the law affords. 
 
6 See Emily Field Van Tassel, Why Judges Resign: Influences on Federal Judicial Service, 1789 to 
1992, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND 
REMOVAL 1137 (1993). A revised version of this report appears as Emily Field Van Tassel, 
Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service—and Disservice—1789–1992, 142 U. 
PA. L. REV. 333 (1993) [hereinafter Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals]. 
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Beginning with Part II, we present the results of our research. In that part, 
we bring the Commission’s work up to date by examining resignations from 
the bench during the period of study. Part III, which explores service in 
senior status, is the heart of this article for two reasons. First, far more 
judges chose service in senior status than all of the other options combined 
during the period of our study. Second, we present in that part a wealth of 
information concerning the work and working conditions of federal judges 
that are as pertinent to other choices as they are to senior status.  
In Part IV, we present our findings concerning retirement, and in Part 
V, we examine the choice some judges have made to remain in regular 
active service rather than to assume senior status or retire. Finally, in Part 
VI we assess the policy implications of our findings and suggest avenues for 
further research.  
I. THE STATUTORY HISTORY OF JUDICIAL CHOICES 
Federal judges contemplating the end of their careers currently have 
four options: retire from the office, retain the office and assume senior 
status, remain in regular active service, or resign, relinquishing the office.7 
These options developed over time as Congress attempted to reconcile the 
Constitution’s requirements of life tenure and undiminished compensation 
with the limitations brought on by age. 
The Constitution contains no provision for the end of federal judges’ 
careers. In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton defended this omission, 
arguing, “few there are who outlive the season of intellectual vigor.”8 He 
criticized the mandatory judicial retirement age of sixty in the New York 
Constitution as inhumane. Since the United States could not afford 
pensions, he insisted, the effect of a similar provision in the U.S. Constitu-
tion would be to force elderly judges to abandon their sole source of 
 
7 For the sake of clarity and consistency, we employ terms derived from the modern statutory 
scheme in 28 U.S.C. §§ 371-374 to describe earlier statutory schemes. Leaving office without any 
further compensation is called resignation; leaving the bench entirely while receiving a pension is 
termed retirement; and ending regular active service while continuing in judicial service is 
described as assuming senior status. This approach is ahistorical, since past statutes employed 
different terms. Until the 1950s, for instance, what is now referred to by § 371 as “retirement in 
senior status” was simply called “retirement.” See, e.g., Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339, 346 
(1934) (addressing alternatives available upon satisfying age and service requirements as 
resignation or retirement). What the statute now calls “[r]etirement on salary”—retirement from 
the office entirely—was confusingly denominated “resignation” until 1984. See, e.g., id.  
8 THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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income.9 Some politicians disagreed with Hamilton’s diagnosis and, on 
three occasions before the Civil War, sought to enact constitutional 
amendments providing a mandatory retirement age.10  
In the absence of any constitutional provision for age or disability, fed-
eral judges had only two options for the end of their judicial careers: resign 
without further compensation or remain on the bench until death. Disabil-
ity, whether or not acknowledged as such by the disabled judge, was a 
serious concern. Between 1801 and 1863, Congress enacted four statutes to 
permit the assignment of judges to perform the duties of disabled district 
and circuit court judges, but none provided for retirement.11  
By 1869, the view that the system was untenable had become wide-
spread, particularly because of the heightened demands on the judiciary 
after the Civil War.12 A graying Supreme Court—with two Justices in their 
seventies, one of whom had to be lifted bodily onto the bench—seemed to 
Congress incapable of handling the increased workload.13 As a result, the 
Judiciary Act of 1869 contained, among other reforms, the first provision for 
federal judicial retirement.14 Judges who reached the age of seventy and had 
served for at least ten years could now retire from office on a pension equal 
to their salary at the time of retirement.15 During the next thirty years, 20 
judges left the bench for reasons of age and health—the same number as in 
the eighty years before the retirement scheme’s creation.16  
The bill that the House passed in 1869 also sought to address the prob-
lem of judicial disability by authorizing disabled judges who had reached 
the age of seventy but had not satisfied the ten-year service requirement to 
retire on salary after they had certified their disability.17 But this provision 
was not part of the legislation that was finally enacted in that year,18 leaving 
Congress to address the issue through case-by-case legislation.19 
 
9 Id. at 474-75. 
10 Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 6, at 396. 
11 See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, 97; Act of March 2, 1809, ch. 27, 2 Stat. 
534; Act of July 29, 1850, ch. 30, 9 Stat. 442; Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 93, 12 Stat. 768. 
12 See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 
(1968). 
13 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 338 (1869) (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
14 Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. 44, 45. 
15 See id. The 1869 Act described leaving office on salary as “resignation,” a term that re-
mained in use until 1984. See supra note 7.  
16 See Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 6, at 395-96. 
17 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
18 See Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 5, 16 Stat. 44, 45. 
19 See, e.g., Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 118, 19 Stat. 57. 
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After 1869, federal judges had three options for the end of their careers: 
resign, remain in office, or fully retire with a pension. A fourth option—
have judges leave regular active service, thereby allowing the appointment 
of an additional judge, but continue to serve on the bench—was contem-
plated during the debate over the 1869 Judiciary Act and was actually 
written into the House bill.20 The Senate rejected this proposal, expressing 
both anxiety over the possibility of having twenty sitting Supreme Court 
Justices and discomfort over forcing superannuated judges to continue to 
work.21  
Judges did not share this view. They regarded retired judges as a valuable 
resource for handling the increased workload of the federal courts. The 
chief judge of the Third Circuit had actually sought to recall a retired judge, 
but, under the provisions of the 1869 law, could not do so.22 He therefore 
urged Congress to create what one congressman described as a “retired list 
which could be called upon, if [the judges] would be willing to serve, to help 
out in any emergency in the business and work of the court.”23 This 
proposal proved uncontroversial because it did not include Supreme Court 
Justices and, as one congressman noted during debate, it provided “the 
benefit of such services without any additional expense to the Govern-
ment.”24 It was enacted in 1919.25  
Federal judges now had a fourth end-of-career option: they could retain 
their office but leave regular active service, while continuing to provide 
judicial service as needed and allowing the appointment of an additional 
judge.26 Like fully retired judges, they would receive a pension equal to 
their salary at the time they left regular active service.27 The 1919 legislation 
also included a provision for presidential appointment of another judge in 
the case of a disabled judge who refused to retire.28 
These four options—resignation, retirement, service in senior status, 
and continued regular active service—have remained available since 1919, 
although Congress has substantially altered key aspects of the scheme. In 
1937, the option of service in senior status was extended to Supreme Court 
 
20 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
21 See id. at 574 (statement of Rep. Trumbull). 
22 See 57 CONG. REC. 428 (1918) (statement of Rep. Graham). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 368 (statement of Rep. Steele). 
25 Act of Feb. 25, 1919, ch. 29, § 6, 40 Stat. 1156, 1157-58.  
26 See id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 1158. 
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Justices, with the proviso that Justices in senior status could be designated 
and assigned only for service on the lower federal courts, not the Supreme 
Court.29 This limitation addressed concerns that had contributed to the 
Senate’s rejection of the House bill in 1869.30 
Extending senior status to Supreme Court Justices also ensured that 
they would have continuing constitutional protection against reduced 
compensation. When senior status was first proposed in 1869, this concern 
was met with incredulity that Congress would ever cut judges’ pensions.31 
But Congress did just that, cutting Oliver Wendell Holmes’s pension in 
half in legislation intended to address the financial crisis of the Great 
Depression, and proponents of extending senior service to the Supreme 
Court argued that Justices deserved the same protection as district and 
circuit judges.32 In addition, although the legislation was introduced prior to 
President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan, proponents acknowledged (and 
some celebrated) that extending senior status to Supreme Court Justices 
would make it easier to defeat Roosevelt’s plan.33 
Disability also required congressional attention. The necessity of passing 
special bills to permit disabled judges to retire before they met the statutory 
requirements had underscored the inadequacy of the 1869 legislation.34 
Legislation enacted in 1939 exempted judges who certified their permanent 
disability from the age and service requirements for senior status, enabling 
them to retire from active service.35 The law aimed to remedy the perceived 
problem of disabled judges who remained on the bench until they qualified 
for a pension.36 
 
29 Act of Mar. 1, 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24. 
30 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. 
31 See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 574 (1869) (statement of Rep. Trumbull) (“If 
Congress passes a law that a judge who resigns at the age of seventy shall be paid his salary after 
he leaves it would be such a breach of faith on the part of the nation afterward not to do it . . . .”); 
cf. id. at 337 (stating that retired judges ought not be “liable to be deprived of the pension by a 
mere repeal of the law”) (statement of Rep. Bingham). 
32 See 81 CONG. REC. 1120 (1937) (statement of Rep. Celler). The Supreme Court held that 
the salary of a judge serving in senior status (then called “retired”) may not be reduced in Booth v. 
United States, 291 U.S. 339, 345 (1934). 
33 See, e.g., 81 CONG. REC. 1120 (statement of Mr. Fish). 
34 See, e.g., 57 CONG. REC. 383 (1918) (statement of Mr. Gard) (advocating a “general rule” 
instead of “a multitude of special bills”); supra text accompanying notes 17-19. 
35 Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 433, 53 Stat. 1204. Receipt of a full pension required ten years of 
service; less service entitled the disabled judge to half his salary. Id. § 3. 
36 See H.R. REP. NO. 76-1323 (1939); S. REP. NO. 76-751 (1939). Judge Posner has noted the 
oddity under current law that “if the judge is declared disabled against his will and forced to retire, 
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On several occasions in the mid-twentieth century, Congress refined 
senior status and judicial retirement. A 1944 law clarified that judges in 
senior status could serve only when “designated and assigned by” the Chief 
Justice or a designated circuit judge in regular active service.37 A 1948 law 
for the first time differentiated the compensation for retired judges from 
that for judges in senior status. Although judges who fully retired continued 
to receive their salary at the time of retirement, judges in senior status now 
received the “salary of the office” and thus were eligible for subsequent 
salary increases and cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs).38 In 1954, judges 
were allowed to assume senior status either at or after age sixty-five with 
fifteen years of service or, as previously, at or after age seventy with ten 
years of service.39 The provisions for full retirement, however, remained 
unchanged.40 
Congress substantially modified judicial retirement again in the 1980s. 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Rule of 80, broadening the availability of 
both service in senior status and retirement and equating their require-
ments. The provision, which remains in effect, allows judges to assume 
senior status or fully retire at or after age sixty-five as long as the combina-
tion of their age and years of service total eighty.41  
Five years later, congressional debate over a substantial judicial pay raise 
led to the introduction of a certification requirement for judges in senior 
status to receive salary increases. The requirement did not apply to COLAs. 
Responding to press accounts that some judges in senior status performed 
little work but would nonetheless receive the proposed salary increase,42 
Congress mandated that those judges who wished to continue to receive 
“the salary of the office” must have a specified minimum workload certified 
by the chief judge of their circuit and the Chief Justice.43 Judges in senior 
status could satisfy this service requirement in one of four ways: they could 
carry a caseload equal to 25% of a regular active service judge’s caseload; 
they could perform “substantial judicial duties” outside the courtroom, also 
 
he will receive full pay for life regardless of how few years of service he has.” RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 32 n.58 (1996). 
37 Act of May 11, 1944, ch. 192, 58 Stat. 218.  
38 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 294, 371, 372, 62 Stat. 869, 901, 903-04. 
39 Act of Feb. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 294, § 4, 68 Stat. 8, 12-13. 
40 Id. 
41 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. II, 
§ 204, 98 Stat. 333, 350 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2006)). 
42 See 135 CONG. REC. 7570 (1989) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
43 See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 705, 103 Stat. 1716, 1770. 
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equal to 25% of those of a judge in regular active service; they could 
complete some combination of the two; or they could provide “substantial 
administrative duties” for the courts or the state and federal governments 
“equal to the full-time work of an employee of the judicial branch.”44 
Disabled judges were exempted from the service requirements upon written 
certification of their disability to the chief judge of their circuit and the 
Chief Justice.45 
Since 1989, the four end-of-career options for federal judges have re-
mained largely unmodified. Although not expressly provided under the 
statute, a judge may resign from the office without pension. Under the 
current provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 371, judges who retire from the office 
receive a pension in the form of an annuity that is equal to their salary at 
the time of retirement. Judges who assume senior status receive the “salary 
of the office,” including COLAs and any subsequent pay increases,46 
although eligibility for pay increases requires that they satisfy the service 
requirement imposed by Congress in 1989.47 The fourth option is to remain 
in regular active service. 
Judges in senior status who are certified as eligible for salary increases 
are free from the restriction on approved teaching income imposed on 
judges in regular active service.48 Retired judges, having relinquished the 
office of judge, are free from any prohibitions that apply to judges who still 
hold the office, including the prohibition against practicing law.49 Finally, 
judges serving in senior status enjoy considerable discretion over their 
dockets but are statutorily excluded from some judicial activities such as, for 
circuit judges, en banc rehearings (when not a member of the original 
panel),50 receiving complaints against judges of the court,51 serving as chief 
judge,52 and exercising some administrative powers.53 
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1770-71. 
46 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1). 
47 Id. 
48 5 U.S.C. app. § 502(b). For the relationship between the 1989 restrictions on outside 
income and COLAs, see infra text accompanying notes 130 & 138. 
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 454. 
50 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). 
51 28 U.S.C. § 351(c). 
52 This is true for both circuit judges, 28 U.S.C. § 45, and district judges, 28 U.S.C. § 136. 
The prohibitions against becoming chief judge also extend to judges in regular active service who 
are older than sixty-four. 28 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1)(A), 136(a)(1)(A). 
53 28 U.S.C. § 296. In 2008, the law was amended to allow a district judge in senior status to 
exercise full administrative responsibilities provided the judge sits on the same court to which she 
was appointed and has performed the equivalent of six months’ full-time work in the previous 
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II. RESIGNATION 
In this part we build on Emily Van Tassel’s excellent research for the 
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal by updating the 
data and testing her conclusions for the period from 1970 through 2009.54 
Since the information presented in this part is derived from public sources, 
and not from questionnaire responses that are subject to confidentiality, we 
use individual names when appropriate.  
Between 1970 and 2009, 80 federal judges resigned from office. The 
number of resignations fluctuated widely by decade: 20 judges resigned 
between 1970 and 1979, 27 between 1980 and 1989, 10 between 1990 and 
1999, and 23 between 2000 and 2009. This represented 3.8%, 3.9%, 1.2%, and 
2.8% of the average number of authorized Article III judgeships during 
those decades, respectively.55 
A. Why Judges Resigned in the Last Four Decades 
Figure 1 displays the reasons judges have offered for resignation from 
1970 through 2009. In the last four decades, return to private practice,56 
appointment to other office, and inadequate salary were the most commonly 
stated motivations, although dissatisfaction of various kinds and for various 
reasons was also very prominent. There is overlap between some of the 
categories; for instance, most resignations motivated by “inadequate salary” 
led to a “return to private practice.”57 We have sorted each resignation into 
a single category by attempting to discern which motivation was foremost, 
based on information available in newspapers and other public sources. 
 
year. Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 503, 121 Stat. 2534, 2542 
(2008). 
54 See Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 6. Drawing on the data available from 
the Federal Judicial Center, see Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012), we have sought 
to replicate Van Tassel’s methodology as closely as possible. We have sorted the reasons for 
resignation into the same seventeen categories she used. Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, 
supra note 6, at app. 420-30 tbl.2. 
55 For the number of authorized Article III judgeships in these years, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 113-15. See also Authorized Judgeships—From 1789 to Present, U.S. COURTS, http://www. 
uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/allauth.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). Temporary 
judgeships, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the District Court of Puerto Rico, and 
the Court of International Trade were excluded for the purposes of this calculation. 
56 For the sake of consistency, we employ this term from Van Tassel when categorizing 
judges, but we use the more accurate term “enter private practice” when describing judges’ actual 
behavior. See Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 6, at 351. 
57 Id. at 351 n.64. 
  
2012] Leaving the Bench 13 
 
The starkest contrast between recent trends and earlier patterns is the 
minimal role played by age and health, the largest category in Van Tassel’s 
sweeping study.58 Other comparisons are more difficult to draw because of 
the small sample size, but returning to private practice and appointment to 
another office appear to have been more prominent motivations for resigna-
tion in the last four decades than they were earlier.59 
Figure 1: Reasons for Resignation, 1970–200960 
 
1. Age and Health 
Age and health have played a minimal role in recent judicial resigna-
tions, probably because of the availability of disability provisions as well as 
declining rates of disability and ill health among seniors.61 Between 1970 
and 2009, only two judges resigned for health reasons, and only one 
resigned for those reasons in the past two decades.62 
 
58 See id. at 351 fig.3 (reporting 101 resignations between 1789 and 1992 for “age/health,” 
compared to only 2 between 1970 and 2009).  
59 Compare id., with infra Figure 1. 
60 For more information on the sources and methodology employed, see supra note 54. 
61 See WAN HE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 60-63 
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf. 
62 See Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 6, at 421; Kenneth Ofgang, District 
Judge Schiavelli to Step Down, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (L.A., Calif.), Sept. 2, 2008, 
at 1 (describing the resignation of George P. Schiavelli following a knee injury). 
22
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14
11
6
4
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2. Appointment to Other Office or Pursuit of Elected Office  
Several judges were appointed to other public offices during the period 
in question.63 In the 1980s, seven judges resigned to accept another appoint-
ment. In the last two decades, another seven judges resigned following ap-
pointment to other offices. Three district judges resigned after appointment to 
the California judiciary,64 while four judges were appointed to federal 
positions as Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration,65 Director 
of the FBI,66 Secretary of Homeland Security,67 and Deputy Attorney 
General.68 In the case of the judges who resigned from the federal judiciary 
to join the California bench, salary may have played a role.69 Finally, two 
judges resigned in the last four decades to pursue elective office. 
 
63 See Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 6, at 423. 
64 See Bob Egelko, Governor Picks Latino for State’s Highest Court—Son of East Los Angeles 
Produce Dealer Would Quit U.S. Judgeship to Replace Late Justice Mosk, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 27, 2001, 
at A1 (describing the appointment of U.S. District Judge Carlos Moreno to the California 
Supreme Court); Josh Richman, Judge in Wal-Mart Lawsuit Tapped for Court of Appeals, TRI-
VALLEY HERALD (Pleasanton, Cal.), Jan. 29, 2008 (U.S. District Judge Martin J. Jenkins); 
Governor Schwarzenegger Appoints Nora Manella to Second District Court of Appeal, CA.GOV (March 
9, 2006), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=373 (U.S. District Judge Nora Manella). 
65 Robert C. Bonner (C.D. Cal.) was appointed Director of the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA) in 1990 by President George H.W. Bush. See DEA Chief Optimistic, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (Cal.), Aug. 17, 1990, at 16A. 
66 Louis Freeh (S.D.N.Y.) was appointed Director of the FBI by President Bill Clinton, and 
served until the end of Clinton’s presidency. Ann Devroy & Michael Isikoff, Federal Judge 
Nominated as New FBI Head—Ex-Prosecutor, Agent, Would Succeed Sessions, WASH. POST, July 21, 
1993, at A1. 
67 Michael Chertoff (3d Cir.) was appointed Secretary of Homeland Security by President 
George W. Bush in 2005 and served until 2009. See Richard W. Stevenson & Eric Lichtblau, Bush 
Names Judge as Homeland Security Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at A1; Spencer S. Hsu, Bush 
Homeland Security Officials to Stay on Till Weds, WASH. POST ( Jan. 19, 2009, 12:00 PM), http:// 
voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/01/19/bush_homeland_security_officia.html?wprss=44. 
68 Mark R. Filip (N.D. Ill.) was appointed Deputy Attorney General by President George 
W. Bush in 2008 and served until 2009. See Dan Eggen, Senate Confirms New No. 2 for Justice Dept., 
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2008, at A4; Spencer S. Hsu, Many Bush Officials Held Over at DHS, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2009, at A4. 
69 At the time they resigned, the three judges received pay increases by joining the Califor-
nia bench of roughly $17,000, $5,000, and $35,000 per year, respectively. Compare 37 SURVEY JUD. 
SALARIES (Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts), no. 1, 2012, available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/ 
cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/judicial&CISOPTR=337 (reporting state salaries), with 
Judicial Salaries Since 1968, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/ 
JudgesJudgeships/docs/JudicialSalarieschart.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (reporting federal 
salaries). 
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3. Dissatisfaction 
As Van Tassel notes, virtually all resignations involve dissatisfaction in 
some sense.70 Between 1970 and 2009, however, 11 judges specifically 
complained about their work as federal judges in explaining their decisions 
to resign. In the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of judges cited systemic 
causes of dissatisfaction. Judge Gabrielle McDonald noted the role of 
“overloaded dockets and lack of support services” in her decision to resign.71 
Judge J. Lawrence Irving expressed his anger over the Sentencing Guide-
lines and the constraints they placed on federal judges in explaining his 
resignation in 1990.72 More recently, dissatisfied judges have cited more 
idiosyncratic causes of discontent. Timothy Lewis, who resigned in 1999, 
described the life of a judge as “a cloistered, sedentary, somewhat monastic 
setting.”73 Stephen Orlofsky, the only judge who cited dissatisfaction as a 
reason for resignation between 2000 and 2009, said that he was frustrated 
by the heavy load of criminal cases and that he was “just looking for new 
challenges.”74 
4. Return to Private Practice, Other Employment, Inadequate Salary 
These factors motivated most resignations from 1970 through 2009. 
Fourteen judges entering private practice during this period specifically 
stated that they were resigning due to inadequate salary. For the other 28 
judges taking nonpublic-sector employment, compensation was probably at 
least a factor: newspaper articles on their resignations often noted that their 
salaries doubled or tripled upon resignation.75 
 
70 See Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 6, at 353 n.73. 
71 U.S. Judge Quits Post in Texas—She Was State’s 1st Black Federal Jurist, DALL. MORNING 
NEWS, Aug. 16, 1988, at 21A. 
72 William Polk, Judge Irving Resigns over Sentencing Rules, SAN DIEGO EVENING TRIB., Sept. 
27, 1990, at A-1. 
73 Ann Belser, Isolation of Court Drives Judge from the Bench: Timothy K. Lewis Joining Local 
Law Firm After 8 Years, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 1, 1999, at B-4. 
74 Kate Coscarelli, District Judge Will Step Down—Respected Jersey Jurist Becomes 8th in the 
Court’s History to Resign, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 20, 2003, at 21. 
75 See, e.g., Belser, supra note 73, at B-4. 
  
16 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1 
 
5. Allegations of Misconduct 
Four judges resigned after allegations of misconduct. Otto Kerner and 
Herbert Fogel resigned in the 1970s.76 In 1993, Robert Collins was con-
victed of bribery and imprisoned; he resigned after an impeachment 
resolution was introduced in Congress.77 In 2008, Edward Nottingham 
resigned in the midst of a Tenth Circuit investigation into allegations that 
he had told a prostitute to lie about the nature of their relationship.78  
In 2009, Judge Samuel Kent was convicted and imprisoned on charges 
stemming from sexual misconduct with two subordinates.79 Although 
ineligible for a pension, he initially attempted to claim retirement on 
disability, which the Fifth Circuit denied.80 After his impeachment, Judge 
Kent attempted to submit a resignation to take effect a year later; when 
Congress proceeded toward trial, he resigned effective June 30, 2009.81  
B. Analysis 
The most notable feature of the data is the variable rate of resignation 
by decade, especially the relatively low rate of resignation among federal 
judges in the 1990s. Although 27 judges resigned from 1980 to 1989 (3.9% of 
average authorized judgeships), and 23 judges resigned from 2000 to 2009 
(2.8%), only 10 resigned from 1990 to 1999 (1.2%). This shift might be an 
aberration, but it might also reflect the impact of the judicial salary increase 
of 1991 and its effectiveness in promoting retention.82 This possibility is 
supported by the smaller proportion of judges who resigned in the 1990s to 
return to private practice or take other employment, or who resigned due to 
 
76 For background on these resignations, see Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 
6, at 385-86, 391-92. 
77 H.R. Res. 207, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. Res. 176, 103d Cong. (1993); Joan McKinney, Bill 
Clinton Receives Collins’ Resignation, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Aug. 7, 1993, at 1-B.  
78 Berny Morson, Judge Nottingham Quits Amid Inquiry; He Faced Possible Impeachment in 
Misconduct Case, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Oct. 22, 2008, at 5. 
79 Chris Paschenko, From Behind Bars Kent Resigns From Bench, GALVESTON COUNTY DAILY 
NEWS (Tex.), June 26, 2009. 
80 See Letter from Edith H. Jones, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
to Samuel B. Kent, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Tex. (May 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/News/news/DeguerinResponseLetter.pdf (denying request to certify 
disability). 
81 See Paschenko, supra note 79. 
82 For a discussion of judicial salaries during the study period, see infra text accompanying 
notes 129-31. 
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inadequate salary, (4 of 10, 40%), than in the 1980s (16 of 27, 59.3%) or the 
2000s (13 of 23, 56.5%). 
Also striking is the apparent continued influence, noted by Van Tassel, 
of age at appointment on resignations. She suggested that judges who resign 
to assume other employment may be younger at appointment than the 
judiciary at large, although she lacked data on the average age of appoint-
ment for the judiciary as a whole.83 Our data support this conclusion. As 
Figure 2 notes, judges who resigned to assume nonpublic-sector employ-
ment from 1970 through 2009 were appointed on average (by decade) at 
relatively young ages—between forty-one and forty-eight. These figures 
were considerably lower than the average age at appointment for all federal 
judges during the same period: 50.5 for circuit judges and 49.6 for district 
judges.84 Of the 33 judges who resigned, 9 were appointed in their thirties, 
and 18 in their forties. 
 
  
 
83 Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 6, at 357-58. 
84 Contrary to a common misperception, the average age of appointment for federal judges 
has remained relatively constant for the past four decades, as the following table of the average age 
of appointment demonstrates: 
 
District Judges Circuit Judges
1970s 49.6 51.9
1980s 49.1 50.1
1990s 49.2 49.7
2000s 50.5 50.4
Average 49.6 50.5
 
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (on file with authors). 
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Figure 2: Average Age at Appointment and Number of Years on Bench for 
Judges Resigning Under Categories of Inadequate Salary, Other 
Employment, or Return to Private Practice 
Thus, the data support Van Tassel’s hypothesis that judges appointed at 
younger ages are more likely to resign than other judges. 
Although Van Tassel did not attempt to explain this phenomenon, one 
important factor may be the effect of pension eligibility on decisions to 
resign. From 1990 to 2009—after retirement from the office was made 
subject to the Rule of 8085—only eight judges above the age of fifty-five 
resigned, one of them for health reasons and two following allegations of 
misconduct. Over 74% of judges who resigned during the entire period of 
study served for less than ten years; 43% spent five or fewer years on the 
bench. As Judge Kent’s effort to obtain disability certification suggests, 
judges consider their pension a valuable asset and are loath to abandon it. 
Another of Van Tassel’s conclusions—that, far from being unprecedent-
edly high, the rate of resignation among federal judges in recent decades is 
considerably lower than in the past—is borne out by these data. Van Tassel 
noted that the 1980s, when the resignation rate was 3.9% of the judiciary,86 
 
85 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
86 We calculate the resignation rate in the 1980s as 3.9%, slightly higher than Van Tassel’s 
calculation. This difference results from the contrast between Van Tassel’s calculation of the 
average authorized judgeships and ours. Van Tassel included all Article III courts, see Resignations 
and Removals, supra note 6, at 341 n.31, while we excluded the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, territorial courts, and the Court of International Trade, see supra note 55. 
5.4
7.3
4.5
8.7
48.2
43.8
41.3
43.4
1970; n=9 1980; n=16 1990; n=4 2000; n=13
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was one of the four lowest decades since 1789.87 In fact, in the last two 
decades the resignation rate has been still lower: in the 1990s it was only 
1.2%, while in the 2000s it was slightly higher, at 2.8%. These rates are 
historically low, matched only by the very low rates in the 1950s and 1960s. 
If one looks only at resignations, the federal judiciary has enjoyed a golden 
age of retention over the past two decades. But, as we discuss in Part IV, 
resignation has not been the only way to leave the federal bench. 
III. SERVICE IN SENIOR STATUS 
A. Introduction 
The brief history in Part I permits readers to situate service in senior 
status among the choices available to federal judges considering whether to 
leave regular active service. Congress created this alternative to full 
retirement for policy reasons having to do with both the federal judiciary as 
an institution and Article III judges as individuals. The historical account in 
Part I also permits readers to track the key subsequent developments in 
retirement from regular active service, many of which are most fruitfully 
considered by reference to contemporaneous arrangements for retirement 
from the office. Thus, Congress added to the incentives favoring senior 
status in 1948 legislation that made judges serving in that status eligible to 
receive the salary of the office, including salary increases, while continuing 
to fix the annuities of fully retired judges at the level of their salaries at the 
time of leaving office.88 It did so again in 1954 by making judges eligible to 
assume senior status at or after age sixty-five with fifteen years of service or 
at or after age seventy with ten years of service, while continuing the latter 
as the exclusive age and service minimums for full retirement.89 
The 1984 legislation introducing the Rule of 80 moved in the opposite 
direction, assimilating service in senior status and full retirement for pur-
poses of eligibility requirements, and thereby eliminating one advantage of 
senior status.90 The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 reduced another advantage 
 
87 Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 6, at 349. 
88 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 371, 62 Stat. 869, 903. 
89 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
90 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 
§ 204, 98 Stat. 333, 350 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 371(c) (2006)). The Senate Judiciary 
Committee stated that the change was designed to eliminate “one unintended negative effect” of 
the existing disparity, namely that “individual judges who have elected [service in senior status] 
may have done so, not because they genuinely wished to continue rendering service, but because 
they did not wish to wait until age 70 to retire.” S. REP. NO. 98-55, at 27 (1983). The Committee 
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by conditioning salary increases (as opposed to COLAs; fully retired judges 
receive neither) for judges in senior status on annual certification that they 
have performed a prescribed minimum amount of work.91 Thereafter 
Congress avoided adding to the advantages of full retirement over service in 
senior status, and instead provided another advantage to senior status over 
regular active service, by exempting judges in senior status who are certified 
for salary increases from the 15% annual limit on outside income earned 
through approved teaching.92 
One of the post-1919 developments that may have escaped attention by 
those reading our general historical account concerns the need for judges in 
senior status to be designated and assigned in order to perform judicial 
service. Prior to the 1944 legislation that clarified this requirement,93 it was 
reported that “some retired judges ha[d] walked into courtrooms and 
announced that they were ready to function, when there was no need for 
their services.”94 The House Judiciary Committee’s report stated that “[i]n 
the interest of orderly administration of justice with regard to the work of 
the courts it is advisable that the activity of the [judges in senior status] be 
fitted into the schedules of the active judges.”95 
Looking forward, if we are to understand why federal judges choose (or 
choose to remain in) senior status over continued regular active service or 
full retirement, we must take into account the aspects of their work that 
may influence choice. Judges who, because of disability, formally assume 
senior status or retire from office are not properly part of that inquiry: in 
the four decades since 1970, it appears that approximately 53 federal judges 
retired from regular active service, voluntarily or involuntarily, due to 
 
also stated its belief, however, that the change would not “significantly affect the numbers of 
judges choosing full retirement as opposed to retirement on senior status,” noting “the incentive 
of continued salary increases if a judge chooses to retire on senior status and continues to perform 
judicial services.” Id. At the time, there was no minimum work requirement governing eligibility 
for salary increases. 
91 See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 705, 103 Stat. 1716, 1770-71 (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 371(e)). The requirements for salary increases are discussed above. See 
supra text accompanying notes 43-45. 
92 See Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 319, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 502(b)). 
93 See Act of May 11, 1944, ch. 192, §§ 1–3, 58 Stat. 218, 218-19 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 294).  
94 90 CONG. REC. 3871 (1944) (statement of Rep. Walter).  
95 H.R. REP. NO. 78-934, at 2 (1943). 
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permanent disability.96 They are not included in the analyses and discussion 
that follow. 
B. Some Demographic Characteristics of Judges in Senior Status, 1970–200997 
There were 89 federal judges serving in senior status on January 1, 1970. 
From that time until December 31, 2009, 2143 judges served on the lower 
federal courts. During the same period, 1006 federal judges served in senior 
status for some period of time, a number that includes those in senior status 
at the start and end of the period. For the period as a whole, we calculated 
the age at which judges assumed senior status. Table 1 and Figure 3 present 
the data. 
 
Table 1: Age at Assuming Senior Status 
 
 All Judges District Judges Circuit Judges 
Minimum 65 65 65 
Maximum 89 89 84 
Average 68 68 68 
Median 68 68 68 
 
  
 
96 We have relied primarily on a list prepared in July 2009 by the Federal Judicial Center’s 
Federal Judicial History Office, but we have supplemented it with a few additional involuntary 
retirements from a list furnished by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (which 
is otherwise incomplete). Both lists are on file with the authors. 
97 We are indebted to Dr. Margaret Williams, Senior Research Associate in the Research 
Division of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) for working with us to define the most pertinent 
data to extract from the FJC’s database and the most useful analyses of those data, and for 
performing the analyses. Any views inferable from those analyses are her own and not necessarily 
those of the FJC. Note that the database does not include circuit judges who sit on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, judges on the Court of International Trade, or 
district judges who sit on territorial courts. 
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Figure 3: Histogram of Age at Assuming Senior Status98 
When we look at the number of years federal judges who did assume 
senior status were eligible before doing so, the averages and medians 
(rounded to the nearest whole numbers) are similar, and Table 2 shows that 
most judges who have assumed senior status have not waited long to do so. 
 
Table 2: Years Serving in Regular Active Service After Senior Eligible 
 
 All Judges District Judges Circuit Judges 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 21 21 19 
Average 2 1 2 
Median 0 0 1 
 
C. The Contemporary Functions of Service in Senior Status 
A great deal has changed since 1919 in the nature and amount of work 
( judicial and administrative) performed by the federal judiciary, the 
 
98 Note that these data include judges who assumed senior status in years (1970–1984) when 
the eligibility rules required the judge to be either at least sixty-five years of age and to have 
served for at least fifteen years, or to be at least seventy years of age and to have served for at least 
ten years. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40. 
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number of Article III judges (and others) who do that work, and the 
contributions to the enterprise of judges serving in senior status. 
1. The Workload of the Federal Judiciary, 1970–2009 
In the four decades since 1970, the number of civil and criminal disposi-
tions by the federal district courts has increased enormously.99 The increase 
has been even more dramatic in the work of the regional courts of ap-
peals.100 Case terminations by themselves are not, however, a good basis for 
assessing workload, whether of a court or of an individual judge. One reason 
is that they do not reflect the resources available to process and consider the 
cases. As we shall see, at least since 1990, the growth in case terminations 
cannot plausibly be attributed to growth in authorized Article III judge-
ships. Yet, as Richard Posner’s discussion of judicial surrogates in the mid-
1980s suggests,101 we are a long way from the days when a Justice of the 
Supreme Court could say with a straight face, “The reason the public thinks 
so much of the Justices of the Supreme Court is that they are almost the 
only people in Washington who do their own work.”102  
Federal judges today have available help that is different in degree and 
in kind from that available when Congress first provided for service in 
senior status—or for that matter in 1970—including more law clerks, 
magistrate judges, special masters, and staff attorneys. For that reason, 
when considering requests for additional judgeships, informed members of 
Congress do not take at face value data reflecting adjusted case filings (for 
the courts of appeals) or weighted average caseloads (for the district courts) 
that omit the contributions of judges in senior status (and, for district 
 
99 Civil case terminations increased 328% from 1970 to 2009: 80,435 civil cases were termi-
nated in 1970, 143,323 in 1979, 235,219 in 1989, 272,526 in 1999, and 263,703 in 2009. The data are 
available in the Judicial Business of the United States Courts reports for 1970, 1979, 1989, 1999, and 
2009. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS tbl.C-1 (1970, 1979, 1989, 1999, & 2009) (civil). Criminal case terminations increased 
204%: 36,819 criminal cases terminated in 1970, 33,442 in 1979, 42,810 in 1989, 56,511 in 1999, and 
75,077 in 2009. See id. tbl.D-1 (criminal). 
100 Appellate terminations increased 565% from 1970 to 2009. In 1970, the regional courts of 
appeals terminated 10,699 cases, in 1979, 18,928 cases, in 1989, 37,372 cases, in 1999, 54,088 cases, 
and in 2009, 60,508 cases. See id. tbl.B-1 (appellate). 
101 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 97-119 (1985); 
id. at 103 (“[A] relationship between caseload growth and law-clerk growth seems plain.”). 
102 The quotation is attributed to Justice Brandeis. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: 
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 122 (9th ed. 2011) (citing CHARLES E. 
WYZANSKI, WHEREAS—A JUDGE’S PREMISES 61 (1944)). 
  
24 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1 
 
courts, of magistrate judges).103 When seeking additional judgeships, the 
Judicial Conference also takes into account, among other factors, the 
number of senior judges, their ages and levels of activity, magistrate judge 
assistance, and the use of visiting judges.104 
Another reason why case terminations are not a sufficient basis for 
assessing workload—this is not intended to be an exhaustive list—is that 
different modes of termination may involve different levels of judicial 
effort. Even the same mode of termination may involve different levels of 
judicial effort over time. As to the former point, recent scholarship has 
documented the near death of trials as a mode of terminating federal civil 
cases in the last fifty years,105 as it has documented the growth of termina-
tions by summary judgment.106 Consider also the phenomenon of procedural, 
as opposed to merits, terminations by the courts of appeals, which have 
increased substantially in recent years.107 As to changes in the same mode of 
termination over time, more than twenty years ago Judge Jon Newman 
observed of courts of appeals that “more and more cases are being decided 
without oral argument and without published opinions.”108  
 
103 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-37R, FEDERAL JUDICIARY: 
INFORMATION ON THE WEIGHTED FILINGS ASSIGNED TO SENIOR DISTRICT AND MAGIS-
TRATE JUDGES IN FISCAL YEAR 1997 IN 21 DISTRICT COURTS (1999) [hereinafter GAO 1999 
Letter]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-17R, FEDERAL JUDICIARY: 
INFORMATION ON CASES ASSIGNED TO SENIOR JUDGES IN FISCAL YEAR 1997 IN FOUR 
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS (1998) [hereinafter GAO 1998 Letter]. 
104 Responding to the Growing Need for Federal Judgeships—The Federal Judgeships Act of 2009: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 8-9 (2009) (statement of J. George Z. Singal, Chair of the Judicial Conference Comm. on 
Judicial Resources); id. at 15 (statement of J. Singal); id. at 2 (opening statement of Sen. 
Whitehouse). 
105 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460-65 (2004). 
106 See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: 
Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 617-18 (2004). 
Increased resolution of cases by summary judgment may not signal a more efficient use of judges’ 
time. “Judges will tell you consistently that they would much rather be in court presiding over a 
trial than they would doing summary judgment motions, which takes hours and hours and hours.” 
Responding to the Growing Need for Federal Judgeships, supra note 104, at 17 (statement of J. Singal).  
107 “While there were nearly 7000 more cases terminated on the merits than procedural 
terminations in 1992, this difference was only 2131 in the 2009 term, with 30,160 merits termina-
tions and 28,029 procedural terminations.” Todd Collins, Re-Opened for Business? Caseloads, Judicial 
Vacancies, and Backlog in the Federal Circuit Courts, 95 JUDICATURE 20, 24 (2011). 
108 Jon O. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the Federal Judicial 
System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 766 (1989). Judge Posner discussed the same phenomena in 1985. 
POSNER, supra note 101, at 119-29; see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“While federal courts of appeals generally lack discretionary review authority, they use their 
authority to decide cases by unpublished—and nonprecedential—dispositions to achieve the same 
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For present purposes we need not enter further into debates about the 
case workload of the federal courts. It suffices that, quite consistently since 
1970,109 both the federal district courts and the regional courts of appeals 
have been required to become involved in an increasing number of cases. It 
remains to be seen what role(s) judges serving in senior status have played 
in the disposition of those cases, a subject to which we will turn shortly.  
Finally, the workload of federal judges, as opposed to that of federal 
courts, is not restricted to the cases or controversies contemplated in Article 
III. The source of Judge Posner’s anxiety about judicial surrogates in 1985 
was that the federal courts had come to resemble a bureaucracy in the 
performance of judicial work.110 The phenomenon has hardly been confined 
to that domain. Management and governance at all levels increasingly 
have relied on committees of judges. For example, in 1970, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States had 16 committees.111 In 2009, it had 25 
committees.112 Some of the increase at all levels has been necessary to 
respond to tasks imposed by federal statutes. Some of it is due not to 
additional statutory responsibilities but to other complexities of the times. 
In addition, the perceived need to protect the interests of the judiciary as a 
branch of government has led both to the creation of new committees and 
to an increasing role for judges on existing committees. 
 
end . . . .”). For current practices, see Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity 
and Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 325-65 (2011) (describing, comparing, 
and analyzing the normative implications of case management practices in five courts of appeals). 
109 Note, however, that circuit court civil filings peaked in 2005, declining approximately 16% 
from 2005 to 2009. See Collins, supra note 107, at 22. For a discussion of the possible reasons for 
that decline, see id. at 22-23. 
110 See POSNER, supra note 101, at 115 (“I mean ‘bureaucracy’ in its popular sense of a large, 
unwieldy organization tenuously held together by paper.”); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucrat-
ization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456 (1983) (“The proliferation of staff and subjudges 
and the delegation of power to them weaken the judge’s individual sense of responsibility.”); 
Newman, supra note 108, at 766-67 (noting the federal courts’ increased reliance on magistrate 
judges and law clerks). 
111 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES v-vi (1970), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Fed
eralCourts/judconf/proceedings/1970-10.pdf. 
112 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 4-36 (2009), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Fed
eralCourts/judconf/proceedings/2009-09.pdf. 
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2. Authorized Judgeships and Vacancies, 1970–2009113 
Over the period covered in this study, the number of judgeships author-
ized for the regional courts of appeals has increased from 97 to 167, with the 
creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
adding 12 circuit judgeships in 1982 (a number that has not changed). Over 
the same period, the number of judgeships authorized for the district courts 
has increased from 510 (plus 1 temporary judgeship)114 to 667 (plus 10 
temporary judgeships). Substantial increases during this period occurred in 
1978, 1984, and 1990. 
The number of authorized judgeships for the courts of appeals has not 
increased since 1990. The number of authorized judgeships for the district 
courts has increased by 35 (with the number of authorized temporary 
judgeships remaining the same). Comparison of authorized judgeship 
increases with increases in case terminations from 1990 to 2009 led us to 
observe that “at least since 1990 the growth in case terminations cannot 
plausibly be attributed to growth in authorized Article III judgeships.”115 
Beyond that, vacancies in authorized judgeships, aggravated by delays in 
the appointment process, require federal judges to share the same amount of 
work among fewer people. As an example, a GAO study found that 
vacancies on the Second Circuit increased adjusted case filings in Fiscal 
Year 1997 from 750 per three-judge panel to 1083 (before accounting for the 
contribution of judges in senior status).116 Recent work analyzing vacancies 
on the courts of appeals in the period from 1992 to 2009 shows that the 
number of vacancy months per year has varied substantially. For example, 
in 2002 “nearly 18 percent” or “one in five active [circuit] judgeships were 
unfilled,” while the percentage of vacancies decreased “to just below 9 
percent” in 2009.117  
 
113 The information presented on authorized judgeships is available at U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/AuthorizedJudgeships.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 
2012). 
114 As the name implies, temporary judgeships do not permanently increase the number of 
authorized judgeships.  
115 Supra text accompanying note 101. 
116 See GAO 1998 Letter, supra note 103, at 5 tbls.2&3. 
117 Collins, supra note 107, at 26. For an analysis linking the vacancy rate to the percentage of 
cases carried over from one term to the next, see id. at 27-28. 
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3. The Ratio of Service in Senior Status to Regular Active Service 
To assess the role that judges serving in senior status have played in the 
work of the federal judiciary, we determined the ratio of the length of their 
service to that of judges in regular active service during the four decades 
covered in our study.118  
Rather than relying only on the numbers of judges in regular active 
service and senior status on given dates, we counted the days judges spent 
in regular active service and in senior status during each decade and 
calculated the relative percentages. We thus took vacancies into account. 
Tables 3 and 4 present the percentage of days of service by judges in regular 
active service and judges in senior status during each decade in our study 
period, displayed separately for the circuit courts and the district courts. 
 
Table 3: Days of Service by Decade—Circuit Courts 
 
 
Judges in Regular 
Active Service 
Judges in Senior  
Status 
1970s 67.3% 32.7% 
1980s 72.3% 27.7% 
1990s 68.5% 31.5% 
2000s 60.8% 39.2% 
 
Table 4: Days of Service by Decade—District Courts 
 
 
Judges in Regular 
Active Service 
Judges in Senior 
Status 
1970s 79.3% 20.7% 
1980s 77.8% 22.2% 
1990s 65.5% 34.5% 
2000s 63.4% 36.6% 
 
The most noteworthy aspects of the data in these tables are the steep 
increases in the ratio of service in senior status to regular active service 
 
118 We are again indebted to Dr. Margaret Williams, Senior Research Associate in the FJC’s 
Research Division, for her invaluable assistance in computing the days in service by decade from 
which these ratios were derived. Any views inferable from her computations are her own and not 
necessarily those of the FJC. The underlying computations are on file with the authors. 
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between the 1980s and the 2000s. Again, there have been no new authorized 
circuit judgeships since 1990. The increase from the 1980s to the 2000s is 
even greater for the district courts (14.4% vs. 11.5% for circuit courts), but 
most of that increase occurred during the 1990s. We think that new 
authorized judgeships contributed to this increase, since all 35 district 
judgeships added after 1990 were authorized in 1999, 2000, and 2003, 
lowering the increase in the ratio of senior service in the 2000s. 
4. Case Work Performed by Judges Serving in Senior Status 
Data from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) 
permit us to determine the percentage of the work for which judges serving 
in senior status have been responsible in the last two decades of our study 
period. For the regional courts of appeals, the data report participations in 
cases in which oral hearings were held and cases submitted on the briefs. 
Table 5 presents the participation percentages attributable to judges in 
senior status. 
 
Table 5: Percentage of Participations by Judges in Senior Status in Oral 
Hearings and Submissions on Briefs in the Regional  
Courts of Appeals, 1990–2009 
 
1990 14.2 1995 13.8 2000 16.4 2005 18.0 
1991 14.9 1996 13.9 2001 15.9 2006 17.1 
1992 14.0 1997 14.7 2002 15.8 2007 18.8 
1993 12.8 1998 15.9 2003 16.9 2008 18.2 
1994 12.3 1999 15.1 2004 17.2 2009 17.8 
 
The data for the district courts separately report all civil and criminal 
case terminations, all trials conducted, all hours in trial, and all hours in 
other proceedings. We present in Table 6 only the percentages for case 
terminations, and comment as appropriate on the other data. 
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Table 6: Percentage of Civil and Criminal Case Terminations by 
District Judges in Senior Status, 1990-2009 
 
1990 12.0 1995 14.9 2000 18.1 2005 16.5 
1991 12.2 1996 14.5 2001 17.7 2006 17.0 
1992 14.5 1997 16.8 2002 17.9 2007 18.2 
1993 15.2 1998 17.1 2003 17.8 2008 22.3 
1994 15.5 1999 17.2 2004 17.3 2009 21.2 
 
The composite averages in the courts of appeals are 14.2% for the 1990s 
and 17.2% for the 2000s. In the district courts the composite averages are 
15.0% for the 1990s and 18.4% for the 2000s. Comparing these composite 
averages by decade with the percentage of service by judges in senior status 
during those decades suggests that, when compared to the case workload of 
judges in regular active service, on average district court judges serving in 
senior status were carrying a 43.5% case workload in the 1990s and a 50.3% 
case workload in the 2000s. The same comparison suggests that on average 
circuit judges in senior status on the regional courts of appeals were 
carrying a 43.9% case workload in the 1990s and a 45.1% case workload in 
the 2000s. 
Indeed, it is probable that these imputed case workloads are understated. 
As of September 30, 2009, 16 of 93 circuit judges in senior status (17.2%) 
and 68 of 347 of district judges in senior status (19.6%) did not have 
chambers and staff.119 On the assumptions that the 2009 data are representa-
tive of the decade and that judges without chambers and staff did no (or 
negligible) work, this suggests that, when compared to the case workload of 
judges in regular active service, the average workload in the 2000s among 
district judges in senior status with chambers and staff was about 62.5%. 
The comparable workload for circuit judges with chambers and staff was 
about 53%. 
On average, district judges in senior status conducted 18.1% of all trials 
during the 1990s; during the 2000s they conducted 19.9% of all trials.120 
 
119 E-mail from Carol Sefren, Chief, Judges’ Compensation and Ret. Servs. Office, Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts, to Stephen Burbank (Dec. 12, 2011) (on file with authors). 
120 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Work of Senior Judges (on file with authors). Note 
that the Administrative Office defines “trial” very broadly to include “hearings on temporary 
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, hearings on contested motions, miscellaneous civil 
cases, and other contested proceedings in which evidence is introduced.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (2009), at 180 tbl.C-7 note. 
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Moreover, in the last two years of the last decade, they conducted 25.1% and 
26.0% of all trials.121 In addition, data compiled for the same three-year 
periods in the 1990s and 2000s show that, with few exceptions, judges in 
senior status provided more than 50% (and often more than 60%) of the 
total district court case work of visiting judges in all three categories for 
which data are collected: civil workload, criminal workload, and trials 
completed.122 Finally, of the 217 transferee judges overseeing 293 Multidis-
trict Litigation (MDL) dockets as of September 5, 2012, 54 (24.9%) were 
district judges in senior status.123  
5. Administrative Work Performed by Judges Serving in Senior Status 
Just as the caseload of federal judges increased substantially over the 
forty years covered in our study, so have the tasks unrelated to deciding 
specific cases that federal judges perform. Unfortunately, however, we do 
not have data on the administrative work of judges in senior status that are 
comparable in breadth or depth to the caseload data presented above. We 
do know that, as of March 2010, a total of 275 federal judges were members 
of committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States, of whom 35 
(12%) were judges in senior status.124 Moreover, we received specific 
information about membership in circuit-wide committees from the nine 
circuits that responded to our questions. On average, judges in senior status 
constituted 19.1% of the committee members, from a high of 26.7% in one 
circuit to a low of 3.2% in another.  
Legislation enacted in 2008 provides that district judges in senior status 
who have performed half the workload of their counterparts in regular 
active service in the previous year “shall have the powers of a judge of that 
court to participate in appointment of court officers and magistrate judges, 
 
121 Admin Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 120. 
122 Id. 
123 MDL Statistics Report—Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets, U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets-
By-District-September-2012.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
124 As for the Judicial Conference itself, because circuit judges in senior status are not eligi-
ble to serve as chief judge, they similarly are not eligible to serve on the Conference. There is no 
such bar to service by district judges in senior status. One district judge in each circuit is elected to 
serve on the Judicial Conference by majority vote of all circuit and district judges in that circuit. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). During the 2000–2009 decade, seven district judges in senior status 
served on the Judicial Conference, two of whom served for more than one term. To access the 
Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States from 2000 through 2009, see 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings.aspx (last visited Oct 11, 
2012). 
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rulemaking, governance, and administrative matters.”125 The same legisla-
tion appears to give the power to participate in the appointment of magis-
trate judges to any district judge in senior status who is designated and 
assigned,126 an inconsistency that has prompted the Judicial Conference to 
call for repeal of the latter provision.127 As to how many judges qualify for 
full administrative participation, we estimated above that in 2009, on 
average nationwide, district judges in senior status performed more than the 
casework required by the 2008 legislation, which is double that required to 
be eligible for salary increases. 
Most of the powers to which the 2008 legislation relates do not portend 
a reduction in administrative work performed by judges in regular active 
service.128 For our purposes they are, therefore, more pertinent to the 
working conditions of, and incentives affecting, district judges in or 
contemplating senior status, which we take up next.  
D. The Contemporary Working Conditions of Judges in Senior Status 
1. Salary, Benefits, and Collateral Financial Consequences 
As we observed in the introduction to this part, differential compensa-
tion for judges in senior status and retired judges had the effect, intended or 
not, of adjusting the incentives potentially affecting choices by federal 
judges, much like the use of different age and service requirements. From 
1970 through 1991, the salary of a federal district judge rose from $40,000 to 
$125,100, while that of a federal circuit judge increased from $42,500 to 
$132,700.129 The differential treatment of judges in senior status and fully 
 
125 Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 503, 121 Stat. 2534, 2542 
(2008) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 296). 
126 See id. § 504 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 631(a)). 
127 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 5-6, 11-12 (2008), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Fed
eralCourts/judconf/proceedings/2008-09.pdf. 
128 The same is not true of service on circuit judicial councils, the members of which, al-
though chosen by a majority vote of judges in regular active service, can include judges in senior 
status. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(3). 
129 Pay Charts and Tables, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesandJudgeships/ 
JudicialCompensation/PayChartsTables.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
Note that there were substantial Quadrennial Commission increases effective March 1, 1969, 
as a result of which 1969 was the year of the “highest real salaries for federal judges since at least 
1913.” DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34281, JUDICIAL SALARY: 
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retired judges would have meant, for example, that for two similarly 
situated district judges (one who assumed senior status and the other who 
retired from the office in 1978) by 1988 the judge in senior status would 
have been paid $89,500, while the fully retired judge would have been paid 
$54,500 (61% of the salary of a judge in senior status). By 1991 (including the 
salary increase in that year, assuming the judge in senior status had been 
certified for salary increases), the gap would have grown to $125,100 vs. 
$54,500 (43.6% of the salary of a judge in senior status). 
There have been no salary increases for federal judges, whatever their 
status, since 1991. In addition, from 1992 through 2009, Congress declined 
to adjust the salaries of federal judges five times when the general federal 
workforce (General Schedule Employees) received COLAs, even though it 
was widely understood in both Congress and the judiciary that automatic 
COLAs were the quid pro quo for the restrictions on outside income 
introduced by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.130 
As a result, the Administrative Office reports that, although the pay of 
most federal workers increased 91% and inflation increased 53% during this 
period, federal judges’ salaries increased only 39%.131 If our two hypothetical 
district judges had left regular active service in 1999 instead of 1978, by 
2009 the judge who had assumed senior status would have been paid 
$174,000 and the judge who had fully retired $136,700 (78.6% of the salary of 
a judge in senior status). 
Congress’s failure to provide a salary increase to federal judges for twenty 
years and its recurrent failure to provide COLAs thus reduced the gap 
between the compensation of judges in senior status and the annuities of 
fully retired judges, making retirement more attractive. To the extent that 
financial considerations drive choices for judges not able or not inclined to 
 
CURRENT ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 3 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/RL34281.pdf. 
130 Federal Judicial Pay Increase Fact Sheet, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Judges 
AndJudgeships/JudicialCompensation/JudicialPayIncreaseFact.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). For 
the understanding of the 1989 legislation, see 135 CONG. REC. 29,686 (1989) (statement of Sen. 
Mitchell) (“a series of measures that are interrelated”); infra text accompanying note 186. For the 
restrictions on outside income, see infra text accompanying note 137. Federal judges also did not 
receive a COLA in 1994, when General Schedule employees received an increase that was 
allocated entirely to locality pay adjustments. Telephone Interview with Richard Jaffe, Chief, 
Judicial Impact Office, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Aug. 10, 2012). After our study period, 
Congress again failed to provide COLAs for federal judges in 2010 and for both judges and 
General Schedule employees in 2011 and 2012. For litigation arising out of Congress’s failure to 
provide COLAs to judges, see infra note 204. 
131 U.S. COURTS, supra note 130. For a table providing nominal and real salaries for federal 
judges and average wage earners from 1955 to 2006, see RUTKUS, supra note 129, at 42-44 app. 2. 
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profit from full retirement, the choice today presumably is between 
assuming senior status and remaining in regular active service.  
Federal judges did not become part of the social security system, and 
hence subject to FICA (social security and Medicare) taxes, until 1984.132 
The law initially distinguished between judges in senior status who contin-
ued to perform some judicial services and those who performed none, and 
applied the taxes only to the former. Once in effect—which it was for only a 
few months in 1986—the distinction quickly revealed powerful evidence of 
the sensitivity of judges’ choices to collateral financial considerations, as 
more than a third of judges then serving in senior status stopped accepting 
case assignments. Chief Justice Burger decried the distinction as a “drastic 
disincentive,” observing that the “experience and wisdom our senior judges 
provide is of even greater value than their substantial quantitative contribu-
tion,” and that “[i]f we lose their services, we lose a priceless asset.”133 
Congress responded in legislation that “permanently exempted senior 
judges performing judicial duties from social security coverage and applied 
retroactively to judicial services performed after December 31, 1983.”134 
Today the most important financial difference between service in senior 
status and regular active service would seem to be precisely that judges in 
senior status are not subject to FICA taxes on their judicial compensation. 
In addition, some state and local taxing authorities treat senior status as 
retirement for purposes of exemption from or reduction of income, wage, 
and similar taxes.135 
The salience of freedom from FICA taxes for the choices that federal 
judges make can only have grown as the purchasing power of federal judicial 
pay has shrunk. In addition, in focus group interviews136 we heard estimates 
that the federal, state, and local tax advantages for judges in senior status 
who live or work where taxing authorities treat their compensation as 
 
132 See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(5)(E). For an overview of the history of this change, see Robin-
son v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 1199, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990). 
133 Ronald J. Ostrow, End Tax on Senior Judges, Burger Urges, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1986, at 17. 
134 Robinson, 905 F.2d at 1201 (describing the effect of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 12112(b), 100 Stat. 288 (1986)). 
135 “While it is still subject to federal income taxation, New York State (along with several 
other states) and New York City exempt senior-status compensation from state and city income 
taxes.” Frederic Block, Senior Status: An “Active” Senior Judge Corrects Some Common Misunderstand-
ings, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 533, 539 (2006).  
136 We use the term to include any interview, whether of a group or an individual, animated 
in part by the aim of refining the questions to be posed in our questionnaires and alerting us to 
questions not amenable to survey research. 
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retirement income total between $25,000 and $30,000—a nontrivial percent-
age of their total compensation.  
As judicial pay has lagged behind inflation, the importance of other 
income should also have grown. Federal judges are forbidden to practice 
law,137 and, following the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, they have been strictly 
constrained in their ability to receive outside income, such as honoraria for 
lectures. Book royalties are not covered by those limitations,138 but the 
exception presumably does not benefit very many federal judges. What 
might make a difference for a larger group of judges is the opportunity to 
earn up to 15% of a specified salary in approved teaching income.139 For 
judges in regular active service, the cap is now at $26,955.140 Judges in senior 
status who have met the workload certification requirement for salary 
increases are exempt from the 15% limit.141 
Another financial advantage of service in senior status arises from the 
fact that the judge’s official duty station is where the judge lives142 and that 
reimbursement is generally available to cover the costs of travel and subsis-
tence expenses “while attending court or transacting official business at a 
place other than his official duty station for any continuous period less than 
thirty calendar days.”143 Although the AO reported in 1999 that most judges 
in senior status did not claim such reimbursement,144 focus group interviews 
suggested that it might be a choice-influencing consideration for some. 
Finally, judges in senior status continue to be eligible to participate in 
almost all of the benefit programs that are offered to judges in regular active 
service, including life insurance, health insurance, and survivor annuity 
programs.145 They are not eligible, however, to continue participating in the 
 
137 28 U.S.C. § 454. 
138 2 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 1020.25 & 1020.30 (2010), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02C-Ch10.pdf. 
139 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(a)(1).  
140 The level II salary for 2011 is $179,700. Salary Table No. 2012-EX, U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. 
MGMT., http://www.opm.gov/oca/12tables/html/ex.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
141 5 U.S.C. app. § 502(b)(2). 
142 28 U.S.C. § 374. 
143 28 U.S.C. § 456(a). 
144 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, SENIOR STATUS AND RETIREMENT FOR ARTI-
CLE III JUDGES 15 (1999). 
145 See id. chs. 6-8. For more recently added benefits programs also available to judges in 
senior status, see the discussions of the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program and 
Long-Term Care Insurance in Article III Judges: Retirement Lifeline, a publication for judges of the 
Judges Compensation and Retirement Services Office. 
  
2012] Leaving the Bench 35 
 
Thrift Savings Plan, which “offers the same type of savings and tax benefits 
many private corporations offer their employees through 401(k) plans.”146 
2. Other Terms and Conditions 
Service in senior status entails both privileges and disabilities—
advantages and disadvantages—as to the nonfinancial terms and conditions 
of the judge’s working environment. 
a. Privileges (Advantages) 
The primary privilege of service in senior status is to reduce the amount 
of work that the judge performs. A circuit judge in senior status who is 
designated and assigned may choose to participate in fewer sittings, or 
otherwise carry a lighter workload, than a judge in regular active service. 
This privilege does not usually include selecting which cases or types of 
cases among those scheduled for a sitting that a judge in senior status will 
hear. In several circuits, however, circuit judges in senior status do not, or 
may choose not to, sit on capital case panels. Responses to our circuit 
executive questionnaire indicate that practices vary as to whether circuit 
judges in senior status are given precedence over judges in regular active 
service once both have provided the dates they prefer to sit. 
For district court judges, focus group interviews and responses to our 
circuit executive questionnaire suggest that, although practices vary, most if 
not all district courts accord judges in senior status some freedom not just to 
reduce their workload, but to do so by selecting the cases in which they will 
participate. This may involve opting out of the criminal (or civil) wheel or 
specifying categories of cases they do not wish to hear (with the permitted 
number of categories also varying). Moreover, the freedom thus accorded 
may extend beyond case types to the type of work a judge in senior status 
will perform, for example, deciding motions rather than presiding at trials. 
For district and circuit judges alike, the freedom to reduce workload 
might be attractive and influence the career choices they made, for a host of 
nonfinancial reasons, including the perception of flagging energy, health 
concerns, family concerns (e.g., a spouse or child who needed extra care), or 
the desire to spend more time with family or pursue other interests. 
To the extent that this freedom entails the ability to be selective about 
cases—as we believe it does to some extent for most if not all district judges 
 
146 SENIOR STATUS AND RETIREMENT, supra note 144, at 24.  
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in senior status—the ability to specialize in, or conversely to avoid, a type of 
case may itself be an important choice-influencing consideration. Thus, for 
instance, before the Supreme Court put a measure of discretion back into 
criminal sentencing,147 senior status provided a means for judges to avoid 
what some perceived as the agony of imposing unjust sentences required by 
the Sentencing Guidelines.148  
For judges who valued the opportunity to spend time in other parts of 
the country—perhaps because they lived where the climate was seasonally 
harsh (and seemed harsher as they aged) or because they wished to spend 
more time with children or grandchildren living far away—the intercircuit 
assignment system might influence the choice to take senior status. The 
same might be true for judges who simply wanted to help colleagues on 
courts in other circuits whose dockets were more burdensome than their own. 
Last among the nonfinancial privileges of service in senior status that we 
deem salient for this project is the opportunity to create a vacancy, thereby 
enabling the appointment of another judge to the court.149 This privilege 
has dominated prior academic research on federal judges leaving regular 
active service, although the phenomenon usually has not been so framed. 
Because political scientists conducted most of the research in question, the 
frame has been strategic partisan retirement.150 The value of some of this 
research is diminished by its failure to distinguish between retirement from 
 
147 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005) (holding that the Sentencing 
Guidelines are “effectively advisory”). 
148 See Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions of 
Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231, 232-34 (2004); see also supra text accompanying note 72.  
149 Recall, however, that a vacancy may not be created when the judge assuming senior status 
serves on a court that has a temporary judgeship. See supra note 114. In particular, that which 
makes the judgeship temporary is precisely Congress’s direction that, after a certain period of 
time, when a judge who holds the judgeship leaves regular active service, the vacancy cannot be 
filled. See, e.g., Temporary Bankruptcy Judgeship Bill Passes, U.S. COURTS (May 31, 2012), http:// 
news.uscourts.gov/temporary-bankruptcy-judgeship-bill-passes. 
150 Compare James F. Spriggs & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893–1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573, 588-89 (1995) (finding evidence of 
strategic retirements), with Christopher J.W. Zorn & Steven R. Van Winkle, A Competing Risks 
Model of Supreme Court Vacancies, 1789–1992, 22 POL. BEHAV. 145, 157 (2000) (finding “little” 
evidence). See also Thomas G. Hansford et al., Politics, Careerism, and the Voluntary Departures of 
U.S. District Court Judges, 38 AM. POL. RES. 986, 998-99 (2010) (finding evidence of partisan 
motivation in the timing of departures by district court judges from regular active service, but 
only among pension-eligible judges). For a summary of empirical studies, see Terri Peretti & Alan 
Rozzi, Modern Departures from the U.S. Supreme Court: Party, Pensions, or Power?, 30 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 131, 138-47 (2011). 
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regular active service and retirement from the office,151 or failure to capture 
changes in age and service requirements or compensation.152 Such details 
may require attention to discrete periods, preventing or making more 
difficult the kind of data aggregation that those who specialize in statistical-
ly-based empirical work, ever in search of a large “n,” prefer, and the best of 
the prior research so acknowledges.153  
Recent studies have persuaded us that, to the extent statistically-based 
empirical research can tell, strategic partisan behavior is dwarfed by other 
factors as a causal influence on the decisions federal judges make that create 
a vacancy.154 Moreover, because our research is multi-method, we are aware 
of factors not previously considered, or buried in large data aggregations or 
in unhelpful explanations (such as “pension eligibility” or “pension qualifi-
cation”),155 that seem to us more likely to have had a significant influence on 
the decision to take senior status and thereby create a vacancy, particularly 
during the last twenty years. In that regard, we are more concerned about 
what causes judges to retire from regular active service (or from the office) 
than we are about whether partisan considerations affect the timing of that 
decision. 
 
151 See, e.g., Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal 
Judges, 1869–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143, 147-48 (2006) (failing to reflect different 
requirements for senior status and retirement in the period from 1954 to 1983); id. at 174 (“Real 
salaries had a negligible effect on turnover rates . . . .”). Peretti and Rozzi also fail to distinguish 
the two in their recent study of Supreme Court “departures” after 1953. See Peretti & Rozzi, supra 
note 150, at 135. 
152 See Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of Judicial 
Tenure: 1945–2000, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 495, 526 (2005). Yoon’s aggregate data cover a 
period, 1919–2002, during which there were two changes (in 1954 and 1984) in the rules governing 
eligibility for senior status. 
153 See, e.g., Richard L. Vining, Jr., Politics, Pragmatism, and Departures from the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 1954–2004, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 834, 837-38 (2009). 
154 See Peretti & Rozzi, supra note 150, at 139 (asserting that there is a “clear consensus re-
garding the powerful effect of pension eligibility on retirement decisions” from the lower federal 
courts); Vining, supra note 153, at 847-52 (referring to pension eligibility and financial incentives 
for voluntary departures); Richard L. Vining, Jr., Judicial Departures and the Introduction of Qualified 
Retirement, 1892–1953, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 139, 139 (2009) (arguing that “personal and institutional 
factors were more influential than political considerations” in judicial retirements and resigna-
tions). 
155 See Peretti & Rozzi, supra note 150, at 139 (“pension eligibility”); Albert Yoon, Love’s 
Labor’s Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 1945–2000, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1029, 1048-
49 (2003) (“pension qualification”). In addition, changes in the rules regarding both senior status 
and retirement during the period studied (1945–2000) call into question Yoon’s use of “pension 
qualification.” Vining acknowledges that statistical analysis of systematic data cannot capture a 
host of potential personal considerations that may influence judges. Vining, supra note 153, at 840 n.12. 
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Increasingly over the period covered by this study, we would expect the 
desire to create a vacancy to have been a major influence on decisions to 
assume senior status. We would also expect that concern for the judge’s 
court, colleagues, and the judiciary animated that desire far more often and 
far more powerfully than did strategic considerations, partisan or personal. 
b. Disabilities (Disadvantages) 
i. Those Imposed by Statute 
Judges in senior status are not eligible to serve as chief judge of their 
courts156 and do not have the power to make appointments to statutory 
positions or designate permanently a depository of funds or a newspaper for 
publication of legal notices.157 With the exception of district judges in senior 
status who qualify under the 2008 legislation discussed previously,158 they 
also do not have the right to vote on administrative matters. Circuit judges 
in senior status are disabled from serving on an en banc court unless it is 
reviewing a decision of a panel of which the judge was a member,159 and 
they are not entitled to preside on regular panels on the basis of their 
seniority.160 Statutory provisions also disable them (although not district 
judges in senior status, who may be elected) from membership on the 
Judicial Conference.161 
Following the 2008 legislation, and with the exception of the eligibility 
requirements for salary increases, which we discuss below, it is difficult to 
believe that any statutory disability would influence a district judge’s choice 
to remain in regular active service (or to fully retire). 
In terms of statutory disabilities, circuit judges in senior status are com-
paratively disadvantaged. The 2008 legislation regarding participation in 
administration does not include them. Moreover, on the assumption that 
judicial work is what most interests federal judges,162 we would expect the 
(statutory) inability of circuit judges in senior status to participate in most 
en banc decisions to be a powerful influence to remain in regular active 
 
156 28 U.S.C. §§ 45, 136 (2006). 
157 Id. § 296. 
158 See supra text accompanying note 125. 
159 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). 
160 Id. § 45(c). 
161 Id. § 331. 
162 See Wilfred Feinberg, The Office of Chief Judge of a Federal Court of Appeals, 53 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 369, 384 (1984) (“For most federal judges, including this one, deciding cases is much more 
interesting than presiding at, or preparing for, meetings.”). 
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service, perhaps overshadowing the (statutory) inability to preside, even 
though presiding carries with it the possibility of assigning the opinion.  
Finally, our focus group interviews suggested that, just as qualifying for 
a salary increase may serve as a financial incentive affecting behavior—as, 
for instance, of a judge who wants to retire fully but at a higher salary—the 
process of annual certification should be considered a condition of employ-
ment potentially affecting judges’ choices. That possibility is also raised by 
information furnished in response to our circuit executive questionnaire.  
Although apparently straightforward and uniform, the statutory re-
quirements for certification are neither. They are, rather, the first layer in a 
regulatory regime that is in large part opaque. As required by the statute, 
the Judicial Conference has promulgated rules to guide “[d]eterminations of 
work performed.”163 At the circuit level, responses to our circuit executive 
questionnaire reveal substantial differences across an array of issues, 
including (1) whether the circuit has its own written policies or guidelines 
for implementing the requirements, (2) what, if any, benchmarks from 
regular active service are used as denominators to determine whether a 
judge in senior status has met the 25% minimums, and even (3) whether, as 
the statute seems to contemplate, annual reporting is required in connection 
with annual certification. 
With the benefit of hindsight, all of the prospective policymaking and 
annual administrative effort devoted to the process of certifying the 
workload of judges in senior status over the last twenty years has been a 
waste of time and money. From that perspective, it is difficult to criticize 
circuits for failing to add additional layers of formality to an academic 
exercise, particularly since neither the statute nor the Judicial Conference’s 
rules require them to do so. Indeed, the latitude for discretionary decision-
making that the Conference’s rules accord circuit chief judges is striking.164 
Although the Judicial Conference’s rules appear intended to be as be-
nign as possible, we learned from our focus group interviews that some 
judges find the entire process demeaning and that others resent the possible 
effects on certification of the fact that a 25% workload on some courts is 
virtually a full workload on others. Any such resentment might be due in 
part to the failure of circuits that have opted for determinate “workload 
equivalencies” to implement the latitude to take account of regional or 
national variation that the Judicial Conference’s rules confer. 
 
163 28 U.S.C. § 371 (e)(2). 
164 See SENIOR STATUS AND RETIREMENT, supra note 144, at app. B 106-07. 
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ii. Those Not Imposed by Statute 
The nonstatutory disabilities or disadvantages of senior status most 
likely to be salient to career choices are changes in space/facilities and staff 
that may result from exercising the privilege to reduce work. The scope of 
potential concern here is greater for district judges than for circuit judges, 
because, although both groups are concerned about chambers, secretaries, 
and law clerks, only the former need worry about courtrooms and court-
room staff.  
In 1944, when Congress clarified the requirement that a judge in senior 
status must be designated and assigned in order to continue providing 
judicial services, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee observed 
that “[t]he facilities for holding court are not available to [a judge in senior 
status]. He has to sit in a courtroom that is regularly assigned to some other 
judge. He has no chambers.”165 Another Congressman argued in support of 
the proposed legislation that “[i]t w[ould] not cost the Government any 
money, but w[ould] permit and enable the retired judges, or those who have 
been disabled . . . to serve the Government without extra pay.”166 These 
statements were consistent with the view expressed twenty-five years earlier 
that continued judicial service by judges in senior status would represent a 
free good from an institutional perspective.167  
If the norm in 1944 was that judges in senior status had neither cham-
bers nor courtrooms, it soon changed. At a 1950 meeting, the Judicial 
Conference  
directed that the Director [of the Administrative Office] permit [judges in 
senior status] to retain their personnel and be furnished with suitable quar-
ters, provided that they continue to perform substantial judicial work, [and] 
that the question as to whether or not the services performed are substantial 
will be a matter for determination by the particular circuit judicial councils 
involved.168  
Forty years later, the Administrative Office prepared a chart for the 
Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch that described the 
 
165 90 CONG. REC. 3871 (1944) (statement of Rep. Walter). 
166 Id. at 3870 (statement of Rep. Sabath). On the use of “retired judges,” see supra note 7. 
167 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
168 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 22 (1950), available at http://www.uscourts.gov 
/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/j
udconf/proceedings/1950-09.pdf. 
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practices of the circuit councils in applying the Judicial Conference’s 
standard of “substantial judicial work.”169 The chart was evidently the basis 
for the Committee’s observation, in its September 1989 report to the 
Conference, that “[t]here is a great deal of variation among the circuits as to 
their policies for certifying staff and chambers.”170 The Committee endorsed 
leaving responsibility for staff and chambers to the councils because it 
“ultimately allows for a flexible, reasoned approach to a variety of unusual 
and changing work situations.”171 
Today, the councils continue to guard their prerogative to deal with the 
assignment of staff and space to judges in senior status according to their 
own views about what constitutes “substantial judicial work.” Whereas, 
however, in 1989, five of the regional circuits had written guidelines (or 
draft guidelines) on the subject,172 the responses to our circuit executive 
questionnaire reveal that in 2012 eleven circuits have such guidelines, 
although some of them apply only to staff. In addition, although the 1989 
chart characterized the minimum workload requirements for staff and 
chambers of eight circuits (out of eleven responding to the question) as 
“subjective,”173 today eleven circuits prescribe determinate requirements as a 
floor both for staff and chambers and for additional staff. 
Although the focus of the circuits’ policies and practices regarding staff 
for judges in senior status has been on the number and types of staff 
available at particular workload levels, focus group interviews alerted us to 
the concern that some judges have about the effect of assuming senior status 
on the quality of the law clerks they can attract. This concern might at the 
margin prompt a judge who foresaw maintaining a substantial caseload to 
remain in regular active service. 
One part of the space landscape has recently been occupied by the Judi-
cial Conference. Under pressure from Congress, and confronted with 
government reports about space usage174 that are as critical as, in the view of 
 
169 See Circuit Practices—Senior Judge Staff and Chambers ( June 1989) (on file with au-
thors); Letter from William R. Burchill, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to 
Stephen Burbank (Aug. 17, 1989) (on file with authors). 
170 REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 7 
(1989) (on file with authors). 
171 Id. at 7. 
172 See Circuit Practices, supra note 169. 
173 Id. 
174 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-417, FEDERAL COURTHOUSE 
CONSTRUCTION: BETTER PLANNING, OVERSIGHT, AND COURTROOM SHARING NEEDED TO 
ADDRESS FUTURE COSTS 42 (2010) [hereinafter BETTER PLANNING]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTA-
BILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-613, FEDERAL COURTHOUSES: RENT INCREASES DUE TO NEW 
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the institutional judiciary, they are ill-informed,175 the Conference pre-
scribed courtroom sharing as a norm for district judges in senior status in 
new courthouse construction. In particular, the Conference adopted a norm 
of one courtroom for every two judges in senior status.176 
Prescribing norms for new construction seems to some judges we talked 
to in focus group interviews an exercise in wishful thinking, and the 2008 
policy does not in any event confront criticisms based on current courtroom 
usage. The same interviews left no doubt in our minds that courtrooms and 
courtroom staff are dear to many district judges, and thus that the potential 
loss of either may be a choice-influencing consideration. 
E. The Questionnaire Survey 
Mindful of the limitations of empirical research that relies primarily on 
statistical modeling, particularly research that neglects important institu-
tional characteristics, and committed more generally to a multi-method 
approach, we determined to test our hypotheses concerning behavioral 
influences by designing a questionnaire to be completed by judges in senior 
status. We also sought to use this instrument to gather additional infor-
mation about these judges, including their views on questions that may be 
important to the policy dimensions of our study. 
We sent our questionnaire to 407 judges, which was the entire popula-
tion of judges in senior status that we identified from the relevant Adminis-
trative Office database as of July 2010. Of the 338 responses we received (an 
extraordinary 83% return rate), we determined that 21 should be excluded 
because they lacked answers to substantial portions of the questionnaire, 
leaving us with 317 responses (a 77.9% effective response rate).177 
 
SPACE AND GROWING ENERGY AND SECURITY COSTS REQUIRE BETTER TRACKING AND 
MANAGEMENT 39 (2006) [hereinafter RENT INCREASES]. 
175 See Letter from James C. Duff to Mark Goldstein, Dir., Physical Infrastructure, Gov’t 
Accountability Office ( June 1, 2010), in BETTER PLANNING, supra note 174, at app. 69 (noting 
“serious concerns about the accuracy of the key data, the misleading way in which information is 
presented, and the soundness of methodologies employed to substantiate the draft report’s 
conclusions”); Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham to Mark Goldstein, Dir., Physical Infrastruc-
ture Gov’t Accountability Office ( June 6, 2006), in RENT INCREASES, supra note 174, at app. 48 
(“[T]he study design and methodology were seriously flawed, rendering [the draft report’s] 
primary conclusions unfounded.”). 
176 See JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 127, at 10. 
177 Not every respondent answered every question, although all 317 answered enough ques-
tions to make their responses as a whole useable. We included in this total four responses from 
judges of the Court of International Trade in senior status. 
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Having first invited respondents to correct the information from the 
public record that we included in the cover letter,178 we asked them to 
identify the extent to which nine specified considerations influenced their 
decision to take senior status, scaled from one (not at all important or not 
applicable) to seven (very important), and also invited them to mention 
other influences. We followed the same format in inquiring about the 
respondents’ experience of serving in senior status and about what influ-
enced them to remain in senior status instead of fully retiring. We then 
asked respondents questions about their average caseload since assuming 
senior status, and how satisfied they were with their decision to assume and 
remain in senior status. Following a question that invited open-ended 
comments pertinent to our study, we asked respondents to identify from a 
menu their principal professional activity immediately before appointment 
to the bench and, separately, during their entire pre-judicial career. The 
final questions inquired about respondents’ race and gender. 
As in all of our questionnaires, we assured respondents that their privacy 
would be protected and that individual names would not be identified with 
responses without specific permission. To that end, the questionnaire forms 
to be completed and returned were labeled only with codes—no names—
and only the senior researchers had the code lists. 
Of 299 judges who answered the question about race, 277 identified 
themselves as White, 12 as African-American, 6 as Hispanic/Latino, 2 as 
Asian, and 2 as Other. Of the 300 judges who answered the question about 
gender, 275 identified themselves as males and 25 as females.179 As to 
professional backgrounds, of 313 judges responding, 232 (74.1%) identified 
private practice as their principal pre-judicial activity, 36 (11.5%) law 
practice with a government agency, 22 (7.0%) government service other 
than law, 2 (0.6%) business or industry, and 22 (7%) “Other.” 
We note two aspects of these data. First, Russell Wheeler has demon-
strated the importance of distinguishing between appointments directly 
from private practice and appointments of those with private practice-
 
178 The information concerned year of appointment, court, appointing President, and years 
in which respondents became eligible for and assumed senior status. 
179 Colleagues we consulted about questionnaire design suggested putting these questions 
last—which we did—because some people find them offensive, an attitude that might affect their 
willingness to continue answering the questionnaire. The decline in the number of judges 
answering these questions from the total number returning usable questionnaires may support that 
view, as do a number of comments received on questionnaire responses. 
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dominated pre-judicial careers.180 We asked questions designed to secure 
information about both aspects of the backgrounds of our respondents. The 
percentage of respondents appointed directly from private practice was 
58%. Second, even as to appointment directly from private practice, the 
judges returning our questionnaire were already in senior status, some of 
them for many years, when they responded. As a result, the comparison 
data to be sought are those collected for administrations going back decades, 
not data on recent appointments.181 
Finally by way of the background data sought in our questionnaire, (1) 
no respondent identified a caseload of “none or very little,” (2) 39 respond-
ents (12.9%) identified their caseloads as “about 25 percent” of the typical 
caseload of a judge on their court in regular active service, (3) 94 (30.3%) as 
“about 50 percent,” (4) 71 (22.9%) as “about 75 percent,” and (5) 106 (34.2%) 
as “a full caseload or close to it.” These data suggest that the 313 respond-
ents to this question consisted overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, of judges 
in senior status with chambers and staff, of whom there were 356 in 
September 2009, and thus that the response rate was even more robust than 
it appears to be when judges in senior status without chambers and staff are 
included in the denominator. 
Of course, as suggested in one of our focus group interviews, some judges 
in senior status may exaggerate their workloads. An alternative explanation 
to exaggeration is that, even among judges in senior status with chambers 
and staff, our respondent pool is biased (through self-selection) towards 
those with heavier workloads. In that regard, some 15 respondents to the 
questionnaire—all district judges—commented that they had not reduced 
their workload, or had not done so to the extent they would like, because of 
their courts’ caseloads and their sense of obligation to their colleagues.182 
Turning to the core of the questionnaire, in Table 7 we present the 
mean scaled responses to the question probing the factors that influenced 
 
180 See Russell Wheeler, Changing Backgrounds of U.S. District Judges: Likely Causes and Possible 
Implications, 93 JUDICATURE 140, 143-44 (2010) (“In short, most district judges appointed from the 
judiciary had private practice–dominated careers before becoming judges, but the length of those 
careers has decreased.”). 
181 See, e.g., id. at 141 tbl.1. It is also worth noting that “current levels are roughly equal to 
those of the presidential administrations of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S Truman.” 
RUTKUS, supra note 129, at 7. 
182 Responses to Letter from S. Jay Plager, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fed. Circuit (Sept. 1, 2010) (on file with authors). Hereinafter we will cite these responses, 
whether individual or collective, as “Responses to Sept. 1 Letter.” This convention does not imply 
that we are citing to the same response or responses. We do this to respect our respondents’ 
anonymity. 
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respondents to take senior status. Again, the scale was from one (not at all 
important or not applicable) to seven (very important), with four being 
somewhat important. The results are ranked in descending order by overall 
mean. 
 
Table 7: Taking Senior Status—Mean Responses 
 
 Overall District Circuit 
I wanted to help the court by creating a 
vacancy. 
4.48 4.75 3.59 
I wanted the federal tax advantages senior 
status affords. 
4.22 4.33 3.81 
I wanted the ability to be selective about my 
case load. 
3.68 3.77 3.41 
Other interests made me want a lighter case 
load. 
3.24 3.15 3.75 
I wanted the available state or local tax 
advantages. 
2.91 3.05 2.24 
I wanted the opportunity to sit with other 
courts. 
2.58 2.54 2.76 
Family concerns made me want a lighter case 
load. 
2.11 1.97 2.68 
Health concerns made me want a lighter case 
load. 
1.62 1.62 1.70 
I wanted additional teaching income. 1.27 1.18 1.63 
 
As our other research had led us to expect, the most important influ-
ences on the decision to assume senior status were the desires to help the 
court by creating a vacancy, to enjoy the federal tax advantages that senior 
status entails, and to reduce or be selective about caseload. The strength of 
these choice-influencing considerations varied somewhat as between district 
judges and circuit judges. Indeed, we had hypothesized that, because of 
workload differences, district judges would identify the ability to be 
selective about caseload as significantly more important than circuit judges. 
Consistent with that hypothesis, the difference in means is statistically 
significant (p < .001).183 
 
183 For this and all other difference of means tests as between district judges and circuit 
judges, we excluded responses from judges of the Court of International Trade. 
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The strength of the desire to help the court by creating a vacancy also 
varied among circuits (including both circuit and district courts). It was at 
its apex in the Second Circuit (combined mean of 5.4), followed by the 
Fourth Circuit (5.0) and the Eleventh Circuit (4.9).184 The high mean for 
the Second Circuit supports its reputation, reported to us in focus group 
interviews, as having a culture of taking senior status upon eligibility or 
shortly thereafter. Also supporting that reputation is the fact that of the 63 
judges we identified as continuing to serve in regular active service for three 
or more years after satisfying the Rule of 80, only 2, 1 district court judge 
and 1 circuit judge, serve in the Second Circuit. As discussed below in 
connection with data about en banc activity, such a culture may, for circuit 
judges, be linked to a culture of avoiding en banc review.185 
Although consistent with our expectations, the fact that federal tax ad-
vantages were the second most powerful influence (combined) on the 
respondents’ decisions to assume senior status is striking. It indicates how 
important what might to others seem a small amount of money has become 
to federal judges after twenty years of no salary increases and intermittent 
COLAs. Indeed, two respondents suggested that Congress’s behavior had 
led to premature assumptions of senior status.186 Another judge, who has 
remained in regular active service, told us that he would “hate to be forced 
into senior status ‘for the money,’ but it is a possibility.”187 We did not 
believe that there would be any significant differences between district 
judges and circuit judges as to tax advantages and were surprised to observe 
the large difference with respect to state or local tax advantages, and to 
learn that it is statistically significant (p < .012). The much higher mean 
among district court judges in senior status probably results from their 
(much) greater numbers in the respondent pool and hence in the non-
randomly distributed locations where such tax advantages exist. 
We believed that there might be a significant difference in the mean 
valence of one other choice-influencing consideration among district and 
circuit court respondents. Because more law professors were appointed to 
the circuit courts than to the district courts in the presidential administrations 
 
184 The means for all regional circuits are: 4.38 (1st Cir.), 5.40 (2d Cir.), 4.22 (3d Cir.), 5.00 
(4th Cir.), 4.45 (5th Cir.), 4.04 (6th Cir.), 4.65 (7th Cir.), 4.65 (8th Cir.), 4.68 (9th Cir.), 3.55 
(10th Cir.), 4.94 (11th Cir.), and 2.17 (D.C. Cir.). 
185 According to Judge Feinberg a “tradition [in the Second Circuit] that goes back to 
Learned Hand[] is that in bancs are not encouraged.” Feinberg, supra note 162, at 376. 
186 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
187 Letter from a district judge to S. Jay Plager, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fed. Circuit ( July 2, 2010) (on file with authors). 
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primarily of interest,188 and because of the nature of their respective judicial 
work, we expected that the desire to earn additional teaching income would 
be a significantly more powerful influence among circuit judges, as it proved 
to be (p < .032). For a few in our survey, the “escape from the cap on 
teaching income was paramount.”189 Another respondent observed, “If my 
judicial salary had been raised according to cost of living I would have been 
willing to sit more and teach less.”190 
Although a considerably less powerful influence on our respondents’ 
decisions to assume senior status than most of those previously discussed, 
the opportunity to sit with other courts was, after all, on average more 
powerful than the desire to earn additional teaching income, health con-
cerns, and family concerns. This finding is in line with our expectation as a 
result of interviews with two judges who have served as Chair of the 
Judicial Conference’s Committee on Intercircuit Transfers. 
In spaces on the questionnaire provided to list other influences, 11 re-
spondents volunteered that strategic considerations affected their decisions, 
usually in favor of taking senior status but in one instance delaying it (at the 
request of a Senator).191 In three instances the strategic consideration was to 
advance other peoples’ opportunities for federal judicial service,192 and in 
another it was to enable another sitting judge to relocate.193 
Our data on when judges assume senior status do not support the asser-
tion of one respondent (a circuit judge) that “most senior-eligible judges 
(not all) hang on until their replacement will be selected by a president they 
prefer politically.”194 Nor is it supported by the best of the prior research 
that focuses on strategic partisan retirement. Moreover, the assertion relates 
to timing rather than to the basic decision to assume senior status. Only six 
of these respondents indicated a desire to benefit a President of the same 
party as the President who appointed them by creating a vacancy,195 and one 
 
188 During the administrations of Presidents Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clin-
ton, 18 law professors were appointed to the district courts, while 24 were appointed to the courts 
of appeals. Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush’s Judiciary: The First Term Record, 88 JUDICATURE 
244, 269 tbl.2, 274 tbl.4 (2005). Obviously the difference becomes much more pronounced when 
one considers the respective total numbers of district and circuit judges. 
189 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
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acted to implement a previous agreement with a senatorial sponsor.196 The 
choices of four of these seven judges suggest that politics was merely one of 
a number of considerations affecting their decisions. For three of them, 
however, politics evidently drove the decision (not just its timing).197  
None of these responses suggests difficulty being candid. Perhaps other 
respondents exaggerated the influence that economic incentives played in 
their decision, but that would confound economic theories of human 
behavior. Of course, the non–self-regarding nature of the desire to help the 
judge’s court by creating a vacancy—the other prime candidate for exagger-
ation—does not sit easily with those theories. Yet, given statistical evidence 
of judges in senior status working much harder than they need to, even to 
qualify for salary increases,198 and powerful anecdotal evidence that concern 
for colleagues animates many of them, this seems another occasion to 
“prefer the messiness of lived experience to the tidiness of unrealistically 
parsimonious models,”199 whether their origins are in economics or political 
science.  
Finally, with respect to the decision to assume senior status, we hypoth-
esized that a private practice–dominated pre-judicial career might reduce 
the influence of one or more of the financial incentives that we posited as 
choice-influencing considerations (items 2-4). However, we found no 
statistically significant difference. 
Table 8 presents the responses to the question asking respondents to 
describe their experience while serving in senior status. 
 
  
 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 119-23. 
199 Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science and Humil-
ity, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND 
WHAT’S AT STAKE 41, 53 (Charles G. Geyh ed., 2011).  
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Table 8: Serving in Senior Status—Mean Responses 
 
 Overall District Circuit 
I have adequate support staff. 6.63 6.67 6.46 
My office and related facilities are satisfactory.  6.62 6.64 6.54 
Senior status has not changed my relationship 
with colleagues. 
6.07 6.24 5.38 
I am treated as a full Article III judge. 5.87 6.08 5.22 
I am able to attract top-flight law clerks. 5.85 5.92 5.60 
I regard certification (for purposes of eligibil-
ity for a salary increase) as wise public policy. 
5.47 5.69 4.62 
My income is adequate for my needs. 4.98 5.05 4.76 
I have adequate time to pursue personal 
interests such as hobbies, travel, etc. 
4.85 4.80 5.05 
I have adequate opportunity to participate in 
judicial administration.  
4.04 4.21 3.43 
I take advantage of and enjoy the opportunity 
to sit on other courts. 
3.19 3.19 3.19 
 
In light of the comparatively greater statutory disadvantages of senior 
status for circuit judges, we expected district judges in senior status to be 
more affirmative about treatment “as a full Article III judge” and about the 
adequacy of their opportunities to participate in judicial administration. 
The differences in means are significant for both (p < .01, p < .02). In part 
for the same reason, and in part because of differences in the salience of 
colleagueship on the two courts, we had a similar expectation regarding the 
effect of senior status on relationships with colleagues. Again, the difference 
of means is significant (p < .01). 
We did not predict, and cannot confidently explain, the sizeable differ-
ence in means between the attitudes toward certification of district and 
circuit judges in senior status, a difference that is also statistically significant 
(p < .01). In fact, the great majority of critical comments about certification 
came from district judges in senior status.  
Overall, the responses to this set of propositions suggest that judges in 
senior status are quite satisfied with their experience, even if they do not all 
share the view of one of our respondents that “[s]enior status is going to 
heaven without dying.”200 As an example, the concern about the ability to 
 
200 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
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continue to attract superior law clerks that we heard in a few focus group 
interviews did not appear to trouble very many of these respondents. The 
response of one of them may suggest why: “Anyone can attract top-flight 
law clerks in this economy.”201 We need not rely on inference, however, to 
assess the level of satisfaction among respondents, since we asked the 
question directly. The mean response for district judges in senior status to 
the question, “In general, how satisfied are you with your decision to 
assume and remain in senior status,” was 6.53; for circuit judges in senior 
status it was 6.37.  
Here too, however, looking at the numbers alone could be misleading. 
Thus, the comparatively lower means for “adequate time to pursue personal 
interests” may reflect the fact that, as previously observed, a substantial 
number of respondents stated that they were working harder than they 
wished to work because of their courts’ caseloads and their sense of obliga-
tion to fellow judges.202 Even more revealing are the comments that the 
proposition, “My income is adequate for my needs,” elicited. With the 
benefit of hindsight, perhaps we should have rephrased this proposition as 
“My salary is adequate for my needs.” A number of respondents noted that 
their scaling reflected other sources of income, whether an inheritance, a 
successful spouse, or teaching income.203 Indeed, in our focus group 
interviews one judge observed that, without the additional teaching income 
available in senior status, he probably would have retired and taken up 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and a number of respondents made 
similar comments. 
Our phrasing did not, however, deter respondents from expressing their 
unhappiness with Congress’s failure to provide a periodic salary increase 
and annual COLAs, or their belief that this behavior manifested lack of 
respect. Many federal judges believe that annual COLAs were promised as 
a quid pro quo for the additional disabilities imposed by the Ethics Reform 
Act of 1989, and that Congress has broken faith by not providing them.204 
More ominously, some 14 respondents said that they were considering 
 
201 Id. 
202 Id. By contrast, one respondent attributed his or her decision to assume senior status to 
an overwhelming caseload and the need to devote adequate attention to each case. Id. 
203 Id. 
204 See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 130. On October 5, 2012, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit sitting en banc held that, in blocking COLAs in 1995, 1996, 1997, 
and 1999, Congress violated the Compensation Clause of Article III. The court also held that 
Congress lacked statutory authority to withhold COLAs in 2007 and 2010. Beer v. United States, 
No. 2012-5012, 2012 WL 4748830 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 5, 2012). 
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retirement in order to earn more money,205 and a few others asserted that 
they would have retired years ago had they known that Congress would fail 
to grant a salary increase and annual COLAs.206 
Conversely, a number of responses, presumably from those no longer 
able to take advantage of the potential financial benefits of full retirement, 
suggest either that the judges were remaining in senior status in the hope of 
receiving a salary increase or COLA,207 or that those incentives may affect 
behavior regarding certification for salary increases (“I fear that certification 
for salary increase may prompt judges to sit who are not well-able to 
sit.”).208 Again, however, we found no support for the hypothesis that 
responses to a proposition implicating the respondent’s financial circum-
stances—here regarding adequacy of income—vary depending on pre-
judicial career. In particular, the difference in means between respondents 
with, and those without, a private practice–dominated pre-judicial career 
was not statistically significant. 
Many respondents to this question took the opportunity to express con-
cerns about the current disadvantages that senior status entails, at least on 
their courts. Thus, several circuit judges in senior status criticized either 
their inability to preside and make opinion assignments,209 their inability to 
vote on whether en banc review of a panel decision should occur (acknowl-
edged to be a statutory disability),210 or the inability even of those carrying 
a significant load to be active in administrative work.211 District judges in 
senior status expressed concern about “intangible changes in how one is 
treated by colleagues, lawyers, and the public,”212 having to keep a full case-
load in order to “insure that I have my own court reporter,”213 and “having 
difficulty getting court reporters to assist me with trials, hearings, etc.”214 
A number of respondents in both groups dislike the title “Senior 
Judge.”215 Some, particularly those carrying a heavy workload, resent the 
misleading impression of retirement or inactivity that the title may convey 
to the bar, litigants, and the public. Others seemingly share the concerns of 
 
205 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
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212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
  
52 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1 
 
a judge in one of our focus group interviews who delayed taking senior 
status out of concern about the impact of a change in status on that judge’s 
ability effectively to preside over long-running structural reform litigation. 
Ironically, the designation “senior judge” was initiated by statute at the 
request of the Judicial Conference in an attempt to obviate similar criti-
cisms of referring to judges in senior status as “retired.”216 In fact, many 
judges use the title of the office to which they were appointed and still hold: 
district judge or circuit judge. 
Designation and assignment is one of several aspects of senior status 
that have raised constitutional concerns.217 We deem the constitutional 
argument chiefly of academic interest,218 which is to say that it seems 
unlikely that the courts would hold the mere requirement—as opposed to 
the manner of its exercise—unconstitutional. In that respect, we liken it to 
the power of circuit councils to certify a federal judge’s (involuntary) 
disability, creating a vacancy and causing the judge so certified to lose 
potentially everything but the office and the salary.219 In both situations, it 
is possible to imagine actions that could raise constitutional questions.220 In 
2007, a distinguished judge in senior status observed with respect to 
designation and assignment that “the requirements of § 294 have proven to 
be pro forma as long as the judge is rendering ‘substantial service,’ and they 
have had little impact on deterring judges from taking senior status.”221 He 
also wrote that he “kn[e]w of no case in which this ‘veto power’ ha[d] been 
exercised.”222 In the course of our research we have been alert to any 
evidence of abuse in the exercise of the designation and assignment power. 
Accordingly, we are concerned about comments from a few respondents 
suggesting that the treatment of judges in senior status lacks evenhanded-
ness and falls short of Judicial Conference policy, which calls for a norm of 
 
216 H.R. REP. NO. 85-171, at 4 (1957). 
217 See, e.g., David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 COR-
NELL L. REV. 453 (2007). 
218 See Betty Binns Fletcher, A Response to Stras & Scott’s Are Senior Judges Unconstitution-
al?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 525 (2007) (“I admire the authors’ imaginations—posing what I see 
as imaginary problems and nonsolutions to the problems they have created.”). 
219 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 372(b), 354(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006). For the antecedents of this legislation, 
see supra text accompanying notes 17-19, & 28. 
220 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 15-17. 
221 Block, supra note 135, at 542. 
222 Id. 
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equal treatment.223 One respondent commented that the “treatment of 
seniors on my court has caused a number of judges to delay going senior.”224 
Another judge observed that dislike of a “senior’s politics” leads the chief 
judge to “move[] against the senior’s docket.”225 
The response to our circuit executive questionnaire from one circuit 
acknowledged judges’ occasional expressions of displeasure about “loss of 
chambers and/or courtrooms and the ability to participate in certain court 
matters” and “anecdotal evidence that some judges have delayed taking 
senior status over such concerns.”226 Comments of a similar tenor from 
judges who have either retired or remained in regular active service, 
combined with statistical evidence concerning those phenomena, suggest 
that there are legitimate concerns. 
Similarly worrisome is a comment from a district judge in senior status: 
“Recent efforts to impose a 50% work requirement on senior judges in this 
circuit have made me believe that senior judges make a convenient target 
that active judges avoid (see e.g. courtroom sharing for senior judges).” 
This judge added: “If I had been more aware of that climate I might have 
reconsidered my decision.”227 
We turn finally to the question of what influences judges to remain in 
senior status instead of fully retiring. Table 9 presents the statistical results 
of our inquiry. 
 
Table 9: Senior Status Instead of Retirement—Mean Responses 
 
 Overall District Circuit 
I like the judicial work of a judge. 6.63 6.69 6.39 
I like my colleagues. 6.28 6.39 6.90 
I like the working conditions of a judge. 6.26 6.30 6.14 
I view this as a lifetime position (or until 
unable to fulfill the duties of a judge). 
6.08 6.16 5.75 
 
223 See JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 
(2010) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN]; JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 84 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. 
224 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
225 Id. 
226 A circuit judge in senior status (from another circuit) asserted that the court’s staff “tends 
to treat me in a manipulative manner” and that “[a]ssigning judges tend to give seniors the most 
onerous cases.” Id. 
227 Id. 
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I enjoy the respect shown to a judge. 5.44 5.57 4.97 
I am not interested in the typical professional 
activities of retired judges. 
4.37 4.41 4.17 
I do not know what I would do if I retired 
from judicial office.  
3.91 3.91 3.81 
I like the administrative work of a judge. 3.54 3.64 3.03 
 
We hypothesized that the greater degree of autonomy that district judges 
enjoy with respect to their work, judicial and administrative, would lead to 
greater satisfaction with that work. As predicted, the differences in means 
for both of the pertinent propositions are statistically significant (p < .015, 
p < .015). We also predicted that the nature and frequency of their interac-
tions with colleagues, the bar, litigants, and the public would yield higher 
means for propositions probing collegial relationships and professional 
respect. Again, the differences in means as to both are statistically signifi-
cant (p < .002, p < .015). 
The perspective informing the proposition, “I view this as a lifetime 
position (or until unable to fulfill the duties of a judge),” was well expressed 
by Dan McGill, a consultant to the National Commission on Judicial 
Discipline and Removal: “The President tenders an offer of lifetime 
employment with no diminution in compensation with the tacit assumption 
that acceptance of the offer carries with it a reciprocal commitment to 
render judicial service at some level of activity as long as the health and 
energy of the individual permits.”228 
The strong influence of that proposition is in tension with numerous 
comments, discussed above, indicating that, because of financial concerns, 
respondents were actively considering retirement or that they would have 
retired years earlier had they known that Congress would fail to provide a 
salary increase or annual COLAs. It is, however, consistent with the 
comments, also previously discussed, of respondents unwilling to abandon 
their colleagues at a time when new judgeships are not being created, 
vacancies are high, and when, in part as a result, in some courts workloads 
are staggering. Moreover, it is also consistent with another set of comments, 
which manifest a strong sense of obligation to render public service and 
thus challenge the premises of public choice theory as applied to the federal 
 
228 Dan M. McGill, Disincentives to Resignation of Disciplined Federal Judges in the Benefits 
Package of the Federal Judiciary, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 1221, 1245 (1993). 
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judiciary. As one respondent observed, “When people ask me about what it 
means to be senior and I explain the financial aspects, they think that I must 
be crazy to work for nothing. I don’t think so.”229 Taken together, however, 
the three sets of comments may suggest that additional erosion of the sense 
of obligation—the evident disillusionment of some judges signals that the 
process is underway—will lead to more decisions to retire rather than to 
assume or to remain in senior status. 
The comments we received suggest the salience of a number of choice-
influencing considerations that are not obviously captured in, or that bring 
alive some of, the posited propositions. Thus, for some judges, particularly 
as they get older or after they have lost a spouse, remaining in office 
provides important psychic income, close friendships with colleagues and 
staff, and an escape from loneliness or boredom (“I don’t play golf or 
fish . . . I enjoy the work and the people with whom I work”).230 Finally, 
judges in senior status contemplating retirement consider alternatives in 
addition to golf and fishing. As some of our interviews suggested, their 
reported satisfaction level may reflect a comparison with the lot of other 
lawyers. One judge we interviewed observed that “many sixty-five year old 
lawyers are depressed.” At least if that remark concerned lawyers no longer 
allowed to work, it suggests the broader phenomenon captured in research 
documenting that workers over sixty are twice as likely to report good to 
excellent health as are their nonworking counterparts.231 
In sum, the opportunities to continue doing important and prestigious 
public service; to do that work surrounded by interesting colleagues, 
assisted by able staff, in pleasant surroundings; and to adjust the amount of 
that work in light of other interests, family and personal (including health) 
concerns, and the inevitable limitations imposed by advancing age—all help 
to explain why service in senior status remains highly valued by most 
respondents. As Dan McGill put it, “the opportunity to continue practicing 
one’s craft in the public interest at a tolerable level of activity into advanced 
years has great appeal for intellectually oriented people.”232 
 
229 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
230 Id. 
231 See HE ET AL., supra note 61, at 89, 91. 
232 McGill, supra note 228, at 1240. 
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IV. RETIREMENT 
A. Introduction 
In an effort to present a comprehensive picture of judicial retirement 
behavior over the years covered by our study, we pursued two parallel 
efforts. First, in order better to understand the recent history of retirement, 
we essentially replicated for retirement in the years between 1970 and 2009 
what Van Tassel did for resignation (and what we supplemented in Part II), 
using the same types of public sources. Second, informed by that research, 
we thought that our understanding of retirement would benefit from a 
multi-method approach that did not rely exclusively on historical research 
and secondary sources. Accordingly, we devised certain statistical analyses 
of the relevant data in the FJC’s database and initiated a questionnaire 
survey of all judges now living that we could identify as having retired from 
the federal judiciary. 
B. The Demographic Data: Retirements 1970–2009233 
From 1970 through 2009, 2143 judges served on the lower federal courts. 
Overall, 101 (4.7%) of these judges retired during this period. Of the 1673 
district judges eligible, 79 (4.7%) retired; of the 470 circuit judges eligible, 
22 (4.7%) retired. 
1. Frequency of Retirement 
Table 10 presents retirement frequency data for all judges by year within 
decades. Tables 11 and 12 present the data for district and circuit judges. 
 
  
 
233 We again express our appreciation to Dr. Margaret S. Williams, Senior Research Associate 
in the FJCs’s Research Division, for her invaluable assistance in compiling and analyzing the data 
presented in this part. Any views inferable from her analyses are her own and not necessarily 
those of the Center. Again, the database does not include the circuit judges who sit on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, judges on the Court of International Trade, or the 
district judges who sit on the territorial courts. During the study period, three judges retired from 
the Federal Circuit, and two judges retired from the District of Puerto Rico. 
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Table 10: All Judges’ Retirement (n = 2143 judges)234 
 
Year Eligible Retired  Year Eligible Retired 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
 
97 
94 
99 
95 
97 
87 
76 
66 
65 
52 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
45 
40 
29 
22 
298 
318 
331 
337 
349 
358 
1 
0 
1 
0 
2 
3 
1 
4 
1 
0 
       
Year Eligible Retired  Year Eligible Retired 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
 
379 
391 
417 
426 
447 
468 
486 
497 
507 
509 
2 
3 
6 
0 
2 
5 
5 
5 
7 
3 
 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
513 
527 
529 
532 
545 
554 
564 
575 
596 
627 
8 
4 
4 
4 
4 
7 
6 
4 
4 
4 
 
Table 11: District Judges’ Retirement (n = 1673 judges) 
 
Year Eligible Retired  Year Eligible Retired 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
61 
59 
64 
61 
62 
54 
46 
39 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
27 
27 
19 
16 
226 
241 
251 
255 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
1 
3 
 
234 Judges who retired under the special provisions for disability (voluntarily or involuntarily) 
were excluded from the count of retirees. There were five such judges. 
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1978 
1979 
 
41 
30 
0 
0 
1988 
1989 
265 
269 
1 
0 
       
Year Eligible Retired  Year Eligible Retired 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
 
285 
297 
322 
323 
342 
363 
382 
390 
399 
396 
1 
2 
5 
0 
1 
2 
4 
3 
6 
1 
 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
401 
404 
401 
403 
414 
418 
423 
436 
453 
475 
8 
4 
2 
4 
3 
7 
5 
4 
3 
4 
 
Table 12: Circuit Judges’ Retirement (n = 470 judges) 
 
Year Eligible Retired  Year Eligible Retired 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
 
36 
35 
35 
34 
35 
33 
30 
27 
24 
22 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
18 
13 
10 
6 
72 
77 
80 
82 
84 
89 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
       
Year Eligible Retired  Year Eligible Retired 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
 
94 
94 
95 
103 
105 
105 
104 
107 
108 
113 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
112 
123 
128 
129 
131 
136 
141 
139 
143 
152 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
 
  
2012] Leaving the Bench 59 
 
Table 10 reflects a substantial increase in the number of judges eligible 
to retire beginning in 1984. This increase was due to the statutory amend-
ment effective in July of that year that changed eligibility for judicial 
retirement from age seventy (with ten years of service) to any combination 
of age and service totaling eighty starting at age sixty-five. Actual retire-
ments increased as well. This general upward trend appears particularly 
dramatic when presented visually, as in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Judicial Retirements by Year, 1980–2009235 
 
As this graph suggests, although retirements peaked in 2000, the long-
term trend continues toward increasing numbers of retirements, even if the 
pace of acceleration has slowed in recent years. Explaining this apparent 
increase in judicial retirements based on the historical data is more difficult. 
The shift to the Rule of 80 in 1984 seems to have had an immediate—
though slight—effect on retirements, but it alone cannot explain any long-
term increase in the retirement rate. The question why pension-eligible 
judges chose to retire rather than assuming, or after assuming, senior status 
(or remaining in regular active service) cannot be answered by citing the 
rules for pension eligibility. 
How the substantial increase in judicial salary in 1991 may have affected 
the retirement rate is open to several interpretations. For example, judges 
 
235 The range of years from 1970 to 1979 is omitted for the sake of presentation. A linear 
best-fit line has been added to demonstrate the trend of the data. 
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who previously were considering resigning before becoming pension-
eligible had an increased incentive not to leave until they were eligible to 
retire with an improved retirement benefit. Perhaps resignation and 
retirement rates are inversely proportional, and substantial salary increases 
have the effect of delaying departures and encouraging retirements rather 
than resignations.  
Based on Tables 10 through 12, it is possible to calculate a precise rate of 
retirement and thus to test whether the apparently dramatic visual trend in 
Figure 4 accurately portrays judicial behavior over time. As reflected in 
Tables 13 through 15, we find that, although the rate of retirement increased 
over the study period, the increase was modest. 
 
Table 13: Retirement Rate of All Judges by Decade 
 
 
Average No. 
Eligible 
Average No. 
Retired 
Rate 
1970s 82.8 0.1 0.12% 
1980s 212.7 1.3 0.61% 
1984–1989 331.8 1.8 0.54% 
1990s 452.7 3.8 0.84% 
2000s 556.0 4.9 0.88% 
 
Table 14: Retirement Rate of District Judges by Decade 
 
 
Average No. 
Eligible 
Average No. 
Retired 
Rate 
1970s 51.7 0.1 0.19% 
1980s 159.6 0.9 0.56% 
1984–1989 251.2 1.3 0.52% 
1990s 349.9 2.5 0.71% 
2000s 422.8 4.4 1.04% 
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Table 15: Retirement Rate of Circuit Judges by Decade 
 
 
Average No. 
Eligible 
Average No. 
Retired 
Rate 
1970s 31.1 0 0 
1980s 53.1 0.4 0.75% 
1984–1989 80.7 0.5 0.62% 
1990s 102.8 1.3 1.26% 
2000s 133.4 0.5 0.37% 
 
2. Retirements Delayed 
Table 16 presents data on the number of years (or days if less than 365) 
that all judges, district judges, and circuit judges continued to serve (either 
in regular active service or in senior status) after becoming eligible to retire 
before actually retiring. 
 
Table 16: Time Between Eligibility and Retirement 
 
 All Judges District Judges Circuit Judges 
Minimum 6 days 6 days 8 days 
Maximum 22.1 years 16.7 years 22.1 years 
Average 4.2 years 4.1 years 4.5 years 
Median 2.2 years 2.4 years 1.7 years 
 
These data indicate that judges do not retire at the first opportunity. 
This observation is borne out by the fact that, as we develop below, most 
judges who become eligible to retire choose to take senior status first. 
3. Age at Retirement 
Looking next at the 101 judges who retired during the years under study, 
Table 17 presents retirement age data separately for all judges, district 
judges, and circuit judges. Figure 5 is a histogram of age at retirement. 
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Table 17: Age at Retirement 
 
 All Judges District Judges Circuit Judges 
Minimum 65 65 65 
Maximum 95 95 92 
Average 71 72 70 
Median 69 69 67 
 
Figure 5: Histogram, Age at Retirement 
 
C. What the Historical Record Teaches 
In this part, using the methodology followed in the Van Tassel study, 
we review and comment on what the historical record tells us about judicial 
retirements over the years we studied. The preceding part presented and 
analyzed data on retirement from the database maintained by the Federal 
Judicial Center. By contrast, the descriptive material in this part is based on 
public documents, newspapers, and the like.236 
 
236 Electronic databases have made these sources more readily available than was the case 
when Van Tassel completed her study of resignations. 
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Analyzing the causal influences on retirements is difficult because judges 
have rarely offered recorded explanations, and the judiciary has had no exit 
interview mechanism. As one respondent to our questionnaire observed, “I 
have been waiting for 12 years for someone in the federal court system to 
ask me why I left.”237 The handful of occasions when judges have spoken 
out may or may not be illustrative of larger trends. For instance, several 
judges noted dissatisfaction with the social isolation of serving as a federal 
judge, as well as with a perceived diminution of the importance and 
authority of judges. 
Figure 6 illustrates the apparent reasons for judges’ retirements. As the 
figure suggests, most of the judicial retirements in the last forty years can be 
loosely grouped into two broad categories. The first consists of a minority 
of judges who retired at an advanced age after many years of service. This 
category includes not simply the small number of judges who explicitly 
cited advanced age or health in explaining their retirement, but also many 
of the judges in the “unknown” category, who retired at the median age of 
eighty after a median ten years of pension eligibility.238 This group of 
judges often retired in their eighties or nineties after as many as twenty 
years in senior status. Few of these judges took other employment after 
retirement, and many of them died shortly after leaving the bench.  
The second and larger category consists of judges who entered private 
practice or other private sector employment after retirement (69%, when 
the categories of inadequate salary, other employment, or dissatisfaction are 
included). By and large, these judges shared several characteristics. First, 
they retired relatively young: the median age for judges who entered private 
practice was 67.5 years. Second, they retired soon after becoming pension-
eligible: the median judge in this group waited only one year after eligibility 
before retiring. Third, although about two-thirds of these judges first 
assumed senior status (47 of 70), they remained in senior status very briefly. 
Beyond this, however, it is difficult to generalize about the judges’ motiva-
tions. Most provided little information about their reasons for retirement, 
although a handful mentioned inadequate salaries, or the isolation of federal 
judges, in explaining their motivations.239 
 
237 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
238 In general, judges rarely provided reasons for retirement. For judges who entered private 
practice, their subsequent employment history offered evidence of motivation; in the case of 
judges who probably retired due to old age or health, however, no external evidence could 
compensate for this lack of data. 
239 For instances when judges reportedly retired because of dissatisfaction, see GEORGE LA 
PLATA, FROM THE BARRIO TO THE BENCH 218-20 (2008) (describing how Judge La Plata had 
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Figure 6: Federal Judges’ Reasons for Retirement, 1970-2009 
The other reasons for retirement were usually idiosyncratic. Three judges 
retired after relatives were appointed to the same court—retirements 
needed to avoid the strictures of an anti-nepotism statute.240 One judge 
stated that his retirement was motivated by political attacks on him during 
the 1996 presidential campaign.241 Two judges retired in protest over the 
 
come to find judging “a bit boring,” as well as lonely and isolating); Carol D. Leonnig, Court 
Honors Judge Who Laid Down Law; Norma Holloway Johnson Retires from U.S. Bench, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 29, 2004, at T4 (reporting that friends stated that Johnson was exhausted from the workload); 
Haven Tobias, The Common Law of Judge Luther Boyd Eubanks 8-10, available at 
http://www.10thcircuithistory.org/pdfs/Eubanks_bio.pdf (attributing Judge Eubanks’s retirement 
to frustration with merely “counting dispositions” as a result of increasing caseload). For instances 
when judges complained of an inadequate salary in explaining their retirement decisions, see Bob 
Egelko, Federal Judge Retires to Join S.F. Arbitration Firm, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2001, at A20 
(quoting Judge Legge’s statement upon return to private practice that “[o]ur salaries here just 
don’t keep up with our cost of living”); Michael P. Mayko, Longtime Federal Judge Calls It Quits, 
CONN. POST (Bridgeport), Jan. 31, 2009 (recording the complaint of Judge Alan Nevas 
that “Congress voted themselves a raise this year, but they continue to treat federal judges as if 
they were second-class citizens. . . . What they are doing is unfair and unrealistic”). 
240 See Donna Walter, Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh Sr. Will Step Down So Limbaugh Jr. Can 
Take Seat, ST. LOUIS DAILY REC. & ST. LOUIS COUNTIAN, June 11, 2008; Mark Binker, Osteen Jr. 
to Replace Father in Judgeship, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (N.C.), Sept. 11, 2007, at B1. 
Retirement was necessary under the revised terms of 28 U.S.C. § 458, which was amended in 1998 
after controversy over the appointment of William Fletcher to the same bench on which his 
mother served. Pub. L. 105-300, § 1(a) (1998), 112 Stat. 2836; see also Neil A. Lewis, Judge Agrees to 
Step Aside to Aid Her Son, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1996, at B11. 
241 After criticism by Bob Dole during the presidential campaign, Judge H. Lee Sarokin 
stated that “the constant politicization of my tenure has made that lifetime dream [of continued 
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implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines,242 while another retired to 
forestall further investigation of his alleged illegal disclosure of a federal 
wiretap.243 
The large majority of judges (73 of 101) assumed senior status prior to 
retirement. For many of these retiring judges, however, service in senior 
status was brief: a matter of a year or even a few months prior to retire-
ment, usually followed by work in the private sector. The large number of 
judges who adopt senior status only briefly before entering the private 
sector suggests that judges are adopting senior status as a conscious transi-
tion to retirement.  
From 1970 through 2009, retirements occurred more frequently from 
some courts than others. Among the district courts, New Jersey, the Central 
District of California, and the Northern District of Illinois had the highest 
raw numbers of retirements. Among the circuit courts, there was less 
variation, but the Fifth Circuit had the highest number of retiring judges. 
Figures 7 and 8 compare the number of retirements against the numbers of 
authorized judgeships (as of 2010) in the district and circuit courts, respec-
tively. 
 
  
 
service on the court] impossible for me. The current tactics . . . will affect the independence of the 
judiciary and the public’s confidence in it, without which it cannot survive.” Robert Rudolph, 
Angry Sarokin Quits Bench, Citing Attacks on His Record, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 5, 
1996, at 1.  
242 Judge John S. Martin wrote an Op-Ed in the New York Times explaining his decision to 
retire, stating,  
When I became a federal judge, I accepted the fact that I would be paid much less 
than I could earn in private practice . . . . I believed I would be compensated by the 
satisfaction of serving the public good—the administration of justice. In recent 
years, however, this sense has been replaced by the distress I feel at being part of a 
sentencing system that is unnecessarily cruel and rigid. 
John S. Martin, Jr., Op-Ed, Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31. He then 
retired rather than continue in senior status. According to his son, Judge Jesse Curtis also cited 
frustration with the federal sentencing guidelines in his decision to retire. Bob Egelko, Jesse Curtis 
Jr.—Judicial Work Was in His Blood, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 8, 2008, at B5. For the influence of the 
Sentencing Guidelines on decisions to resign and to assume senior status, see supra text 
accompanying notes 72 & 148. 
243 Judge Robert Aguilar was prosecuted for seven years for illegal disclosure of wiretap 
information, but prosecutors abandoned further judicial proceedings after the Ninth Circuit 
reversed his conviction and Aguilar retired. Bob Egelko, Judge Aguilar Retires After Last Charge 
Dropped, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Cal.), June 25, 1996, at A11. 
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Figure 7: Highest Retirement District Courts, 1970–2009244 
 
Figure 8: Judicial Retirements by Circuit, 1970–2009245 
 
 
244 See U.S. COURTS, supra note 113. 
245 See id. There were no retirements from the First or the Seventh Circuit during the period 
of study. 
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Although the retirement rates from some courts seem disproportionately 
large, some of the absences are just as notable. The Eastern District of New 
York, for instance, had no retirements from 1970 through 2009, even though 
it has 15 authorized judgeships (as compared with 17 for New Jersey). These 
disparities raise the question whether the policies or culture of individual 
courts concerning judges in senior status have an effect on retirement rates, 
a question that requires additional research. 
One anomaly seems to have at least a partial explanation. The District 
Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia have comparatively high retirement rates. There may 
be greater opportunities for these prominent judges to receive appointments 
to other public offices. Indeed, the three judges appointed to other public 
office after retirement during the study period all served on one of these 
courts.246 
D. The Questionnaire Survey 
1. Methodology 
 We distributed a questionnaire to all retired judges we could identify as 
now living who retired during the period from 1970 through 2009, a group 
of seventy-two judges. We received responses from 60 of the judges, for a 
return rate of 83%, which is comparable to the rate of return to our senior 
status questionnaire. As with that questionnaire, we excluded those returns, 
of which there were eight, that left substantial portions of the questionnaire 
unanswered. We thus had 52 substantially complete responses, for an 
effective response rate of 72%.  
Because a judge who is eligible under the Rule of 80 may retire directly 
from regular active service or choose to serve in senior status and later 
retire, we divided the pool of survey recipients into two corresponding 
groups. For those judges who retired without having taken senior status, we 
asked how, if at all, their decision was affected by health concerns, family 
concerns, or other personal concerns or interests, such as wanting more time 
 
246 See Douglas Jehl, Judge on a Return Mission to Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at A15 
(recounting Judge Abner Joseph Mikva’s appointment as White House Counsel); Today in 
Congress, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1985, at A12 (noting the appointment and confirmation of former 
federal judge Malcolm Wilkey as ambassador to Uruguay); Jerry Zeifman, War Tribunal Cleans Up 
Its Act, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at 26 (describing Judge Patricia Wald’s appointment as 
Chief Justice of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia). 
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to travel or to pursue hobbies or similar such interests. We asked whether 
the judge no longer found the work interesting or simply wanted new 
challenges. And we asked whether salary or a felt need for more income was 
a factor. For the other group of judges—those who took senior status before 
retiring—we asked both about the factors that influenced the decision first 
to take senior status and about the factors that influenced the later decision 
to retire. We used essentially the same inquiries as in our questionnaires for 
judges currently in senior status and for those who retired directly. This 
method permitted a considerable amount of cross-comparison. 
In addition to these questions directed at influences on a judge’s indi-
vidual decisions, we asked a set of more general questions about background 
characteristics and post-retirement activity. For those questions requiring 
scaling, we asked for responses on a scale of one (least or not applicable) to 
seven (highest). For questions asking for factual data, we offered a menu of 
choices from which the respondent could choose, including, where appro-
priate, a choice of “Other” with room for explanation. We invited respond-
ents to add their comments throughout and received a good number. 
2. The Results 
Forty-nine of the 52 respondents answered the question about race, of 
whom 41 identified themselves as White, 5 as African-American, 2 as 
Hispanic, 0 as Asian, and 1 as Other. Forty-eight respondents answered the 
question about gender, of whom 45 identified themselves as male and 3 as 
female. 
With regard to professional background, we asked about the respond-
ent’s principal professional activity prior to judicial service, and also the 
primary professional activity immediately before appointment to the bench. 
Forty-nine of the 52 responses gave answers to these questions. Table 18 
reports the first; Table 19 the second.247 
  
 
247 Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
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Table 18: Principal Professional Activity Before Appointment 
 
 Overall District Judges Circuit Judges 
Private Practice of Law 34 (69)% 27 7 
Law Practice With a 
Government Agency 
8 (16%) 6 2 
Government Service Other 
than Law 
1 (2%) 0 1 
Business or Industry 0 0 0 
Other 6 (12%) 0 6 
 
Table 19: Primary Activity Immediately Before Appointment 
 
 Overall District Judges Circuit Judges 
Private Practice of Law 31 (63%) 24 7 
Law Practice With a 
Government Agency 
5 (10%) 4 1 
Government Service Other 
than Law 
6 (12%) 4 2 
Business or Industry 0 0 0 
Other 7 (14%) 5 2 
 
As the data indicate, not much changed between these judges’ primary 
professional activities and their activities immediately before assuming the 
bench. The respondents in the Other category were primarily state court 
trial judges before appointment to the federal bench. 
Comparing this group of judges to the judges in senior status, the major-
ity of both groups were in private practice during their careers and immedi-
ately before appointment to the bench. As Table 19 shows, the percentage 
of retired judges appointed directly from private practice was 63%; for 
respondents to our senior status questionnaire, the percentage was some-
what lower at 58%.  
Turning to the core of the questionnaire, we found that 65.4% of the 
respondent retired judges (34 of the 52) first took senior status before later 
retiring. In Table 20 we report on the factors that influenced these judges to 
make that first decision. The order of presentation is from highest to lowest 
in overall mean. 
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Table 20: Taking Senior Status Before Retiring 
 
 
Overall 
Mean 
District 
Court Mean 
Circuit 
Court Mean 
I wanted to help the court by 
creating a vacancy 
4.7 4.8 4.6 
I intended to retire soon but thought 
senior status might be a useful 
transition 
2.9 3.1 2.3 
I wanted the ability to be selective 
about my case load 
2.9 3.1 2.3 
I wanted the tax advantages related 
to FICA 
2.3 2.4 1.9 
I wanted the available state or local 
tax advantages 
2.3 2.5 1.6 
I wanted the opportunity to sit with 
other courts 
2.2 2.2 2.1 
Family concerns made me want a 
lighter case load 
1.5 1.6 1.0 
I wanted additional teaching income 1.4 1.2 2.1 
Health concerns made me want a 
lighter case load 
1.3 1.4 1.0 
 
What is striking about the table is the sharp drop-off from the mean for 
helping the court by creating a vacancy (4.7 overall) to the next highest (2.9 
overall), tied by those who saw senior status as a transition and those 
wanting to be selective about their case load. 
The perceived importance of creating a vacancy was also apparent in the 
responses to our senior status questionnaire. As with the senior status 
questionnaire, we had hypothesized that the mean response of district 
judges to this proposition in the retired judges’ questionnaire would be 
significantly higher than that of circuit judges, and for the same reasons.248 
Although it was higher, the difference is not statistically significant. 
After creating a vacancy, the judges in senior status were most interested 
in the federal tax advantages of leaving regular active service, whereas the 
now-retired judges valued most the ability to be more selective about their 
caseload and the use of senior status as a transition to retirement. Com-
ments provided by respondents suggest that some judges who used senior 
 
248 See supra text accompanying note 183. 
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status as a way station to retirement were thereby seeking to mitigate the 
consequences of prolonged vacancies for their courts or to clean up their 
dockets before leaving the bench. Although the desire to earn additional 
teaching income was stronger among circuit judges than among district 
judges, unlike the result for the comparable proposition in the senior status 
questionnaire,249 the difference is not statistically significant. 
Neither the judges now in senior status nor the judges who retired from 
senior status indicated that health or family concerns were important 
influences. Although we did not expect it, the difference between the 
greater salience of family concerns to district judges than to circuit judges 
among those now retired is statistically significant (p < .01). 
In comparing these two groups, it is interesting to note that the retired 
judges gave scaled responses generally lower than the judges in senior status 
to basically the same questions. We think that this phenomenon may be due 
in part to the difficulty that judges now retired may have had in recon-
structing their decisions to take senior status, coupled with the fact that for 
many of them senior status was merely a transition. 
We asked these judges a series of questions intended to tease out the 
influences that caused them ultimately to retire from the office. Table 21 
reports the results. 
 
Table 21: Retirement After Senior Status 
 
 
Overall 
Mean 
Dist. Ct. 
Mean 
Cir. Ct. 
Mean 
I wanted more income 4.8 5.5 1.9 
I wanted new challenges 4.2 3.9 5.7 
I took senior status intending to retire shortly 
thereafter 
3.0 3.4 1.6 
I wanted more free time to pursue personal 
interests, such as hobbies, travel, etc. 
2.7 2.7 2.3 
I found I was not being treated as a full 
Article III judge 
2.3 2.4 1.6 
I found having to certify my work activity 
(for purposes of eligibility for a salary 
increase) demeaning 
2.3 2.6 1.0 
I found senior status changed my relation-
ships with colleagues in ways I did not like 
2.1 2.3 1.6 
 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 189-90. 
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I had family concerns 2.1 2.1 1.9 
I had health concerns 1.6 1.8 1.0 
I found my office and related facilities no 
longer satisfactory 
1.5 1.6 1.0 
I no longer had adequate support staff 1.4 1.5 1.0 
I was not able to attract top-flight law clerks 1.1 1.2 1.0 
The work of a judge no longer interested me 1.8 1.8 1.6 
 
The desire for more income now becomes the strongest influence over-
all, clearly for the district judges, but much less so for the circuit judges. We 
expected that the desire for more income would be a more powerful choice-
influencing consideration among district judges, and the difference is 
statistically significant (p < .01). As with the senior status questionnaire, 
however, we did not find support for our hypothesis that previous profes-
sional background, in particular a private practice–dominated pre-judicial 
career, might affect answers to questions implicating financial concerns. 
There were no statistically significant differences along this dimension. 
More income is followed second in strength by a desire for new challenges, 
but this time more strongly felt by the circuit judges than the district 
judges. 
Among this set of judges, and particularly the district judges, the inten-
tion to retire shortly after taking senior status was evident. This is con-
sistent with how the respondents had answered the earlier question about 
intending to use senior status as a transition to retirement. We did not 
expect any difference between the district and circuit judges on this 
question and were thus surprised to learn that the difference in means is 
statistically significant (p < .03). As before, family and health concerns 
seemed to play a small part in the decision to retire. 
Overall, the respondents do not report having been adversely influenced 
by the policies and practices of their courts regarding support for judges in 
senior status, such as those related to staff or facilities, or by their ability to 
attract good law clerks. This finding is consistent with the results of our 
senior status questionnaire, the responses to which indicated, in general, 
high satisfaction with staff and support practices. 
Although some judges in the retired group reported that they felt they 
had not been treated as full Article III judges or that their relationships 
with their colleagues had been adversely affected, these factors were not 
overall a strong influence on leaving the bench, just as they were not 
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reported as factors of significant concern by the judges in senior status.250 
The retired judges indicated an interest in more free time to pursue 
personal interests, while the judges in senior status reported general 
satisfaction with the free time they had. 
Another set of comparisons can be made between the judges who first 
took senior status and then retired, and the smaller number of judges (18) 
who retired during these years directly from regular active service. Table 22 
lists the propositions we put to this latter group of judges, and their 
responses. 
 
Table 22: Retirement Directly from Regular Active Service 
 
 
Overall 
Means 
Dist. Ct. 
Means 
Cir. Ct. 
Means 
I wanted more income 4.9 5.6 4.0 
I wanted new challenges 4.1 3.9 4.3 
I wanted more free time to 
pursue personal interests 
2.9 2.7 3.1 
I had family concerns 1.8 1.5 2.3 
I had health concerns 1.3 1.6 1.0 
The work of a judge no longer 
interested me 
1.2 1.3 1.1 
 
Although the small number in this group counsels caution, we note that 
both district and circuit judges placed more income at the top of their list of 
concerns. The circuit judges now join the district judges in the salience of 
the consideration, with a mean score close to the top of their concerns. As 
we predicted, the difference in aggregate means for this question is statisti-
cally significant (p < .01). New challenges continue to share second place as 
an influential factor in the decision to retire. For the judges who retired 
directly, there is then a distinct drop in scores for the remaining influences, 
and again health and family concerns score toward the bottom. 
There is one consistent noninfluence: lack of interest in the work of a 
judge does not seem to be a problem that causes judges to retire. A compar-
ison can be made with the responses of judges in senior status as to why 
they did not retire.251 These judges reported affirmatively that they liked 
 
250 See supra Table 8. 
251 See supra Table 9. 
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the judicial work of a judge (the district judges’ mean was 6.7, and the 
circuit judges’ mean was 6.4) and that they liked the working conditions of 
a judge (6.3 and 6.1, respectively). These high mean responses suggest that 
neither the work nor the working conditions cause the judiciary to lose the 
services of some of its most experienced personnel. 
Returning to the overall cohort of 52 judges, many commented about 
the effect of Congress’s failure to provide a salary increase or annual 
COLAs on their decision to retire. For some, the failure to keep pace with 
inflation broke what they regarded as a commitment in connection with the 
Ethics Reform Act of 1989. For others, it manifested lack of respect for the 
federal judiciary. For many, whatever congressional policy signaled, it made 
their situation untenable. One judge simply noted: “I have three teens 
headed to college.”252 Others expressed frustration or disillusionment, often 
coupled with regret that financial considerations trumped their career 
preference. Here is a sample of the comments:  
 
 “Grossly inadequate salary is demeaning and necessitated my retire-
ment. Had judges been fairly compensated I never would have re-
tired.”253 
 “If we had been treated fairly by Congress I would have stayed [] in 
some capacity for a lot less income than I have now!”254  
 “The time I spent as a federal judge was the best of my professional 
career. The workload and economics just made no sense.”255  
 “The failure of Congress to grant COLA’s was insulting and demean-
ing.”256  
 “Had Congress kept its promise of $125,000 in constant 1989 dollars, I 
would still be on the bench.”257  
 “[B]eing a federal district judge was the greatest professional experi-
ence of my life. I left it only out of dire economic necessity [related 
to having children in college and graduate school].”258 
 
Notwithstanding generally high levels of satisfaction with the work of 
federal judges, a few retired judges, primarily circuit judges, expressed 
 
252 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
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strong dissatisfaction with the perceived ideological direction of their court 
or the Supreme Court, or with the perceived politicization of the appoint-
ments process.259 Unlike the respondents to the senior status questionnaire, 
however, not one respondent to the retired judges’ questionnaire reported 
any strategic influence, partisan or otherwise, on the decisions to take senior 
status or to retire, except to the extent that using senior status as a transi-
tion to retirement is so conceived. As suggested by the responses quoted 
above, lack of candor seems not to be a concern. 
We asked the retired judges to whom we sent our questionnaire about 
the kinds of activities or employment, if any, they engaged in after retire-
ment, and we followed that with a question about their current activity or 
occupation. Regarding activity after retirement, a whopping 83% (n = 43) 
reported working at some point and to some extent as an arbitrator, 
mediator, or in a similar activity for pay. Some of these judges left the 
bench to work for JAMS (formerly Judicial Arbitration and Mediation 
Services) or other ADR providers. Thirty-five percent of all respondents 
(18) went into full-time law practice, and 12% (6) into part-time law 
practice. Twenty-one percent (11) engaged in volunteer community or 
public service, and 17% (9) taught. Of the other activities reported—
government employment, in-house legal services, full or part-time private 
sector work other than in the practice of law—each involved three or fewer 
judges. Three judges reported no significant outside employment.  
Finally, we wondered how retired judges felt in retrospect about their 
decision to leave the bench. Their responses indicated a mean overall 
satisfaction level of 6.1, with district judges at 6.0 and circuit judges at 6.6. 
These scores indicate a high degree of satisfaction with the decision to 
retire. On the basis of our interviews and our overall assessment of the 
questionnaire returns, we are inclined to credit the judges with a high 
degree of self-awareness and no propensity to be less than candid.  
V. JUDGES IN REGULAR ACTIVE SERVICE 
A. Introduction 
We have considered judges who, when eligible, chose to take senior 
status and the smaller group that chose to retire. We now consider an even 
smaller group of judges who, although eligible for senior status or retirement, 
 
259 Id. 
  
76 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1 
 
choose instead to remain in regular active service for what would appear to 
be an indefinite time. 
B. Demographics 
 To avoid surveying still-active judges who might be on the verge of 
taking senior status or retiring altogether, we identified those who remained 
in regular active service for three or more years after eligibility. Using 
available databases, we found 63 judges in that group: 30 district judges, 32 
circuit judges, and 1 judge on the Court of International Trade. These 
numbers contrast with the comparable ratios for the judges in senior status 
and retired judges who received our questionnaires, as well as with the 
federal judiciary as a whole, in which district judges predominate. 
Given the unusual predominance of circuit judges in the study group, in 
Table 23 we show the number of circuit judges in each circuit who are in the 
study group and the percentage they constitute of authorized circuit court 
judgeships; for comparison we also show the number of district judges in 
each circuit who are in the study group. 
 
Table 23: Percentage of Authorized Circuit Court Judgeships Held by 
Judges Remaining in Regular Active Service for Three or More Years 
 
Circuit 
District 
Judges 
Circuit 
Judges 
Authorized Judgeships 
(Percentage of Circuit 
Judges in Group) 
First 6 2 6 (33%) 
Second 1 2 13 (15%) 
Third 1 3 14 (21%) 
Fourth 2 1 15 (7%) 
Fifth 6 6 17 (35%) 
Sixth 1 1 16 (6%) 
Seventh 4 4 11 (36%) 
Eighth 2 2 11 (18%) 
Ninth 4 4 29 (14%) 
Tenth 1 2 12 (17%) 
Eleventh 2 2 12 (17%) 
D.C. 0 1 11 (9%) 
Federal Circuit — 2 12 (17%) 
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About 18% of judges serving on the circuit courts are judges who have 
opted to stay in regular active service for three or more years after becom-
ing eligible to leave under the Rule of 80; for district judges that percentage 
is about 5%. The table reveals three outlier circuit courts that have the 
highest percentages of judges in the study group, all above 30%: the 
Seventh, Fifth, and First. The responses to our questionnaire suggest a 
number of plausible explanations. 
From the 63 judges to whom we sent the questionnaire, we received 44 
responses. The responding group consisted of 19 district judges and 24 
circuit judges, and there was 1 response from a judge of the Court of 
International Trade. This was a return rate of 70% of the survey group. Of 
the 44 responses, 41 were substantially complete and constitute our database 
(65% effective response rate). As with the respondents to the other surveys, 
not all respondents answered all questions. 
Thirty-eight judges identified their race: 36 White and 2 Hispanic; none 
checked African-American or Asian. Several judges commented about the 
question itself, even when they did not answer it. One judge who answered 
the question asked, “Why is this important?”260 Another expressed the view 
that “[t]hese questions [referring to race and sex] demean the entire survey 
and made me skeptical of responding.”261 
Forty judges identified their sex: 33 are male and 7 are female. All but 
one of the female respondents are circuit judges. 
As with the other groups surveyed, we asked these judges about their 
principal professional activity prior to judicial service and their primary 
professional activity immediately before appointment to the bench. Table 
24 reports on the first; Table 25 reports on the second. In both, the choices 
are arrayed in descending rank order. 
  
 
260 Id. 
261 Id. Like many other people, some judges are reluctant to provide racial identification; 
indeed, some judges refuse to answer routine requests for such data, for example, statistical 
inquiries about race concerning interviews for law clerk positions. Survey designers are sensitive 
to this issue, and this response validates the advice we were given to put these questions last. See 
supra note 179. 
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Table 24: Principal Professional Activity Prior to Appointment 
 
 Overall 
District 
Judges 
Circuit 
Judges 
Private practice of law 26 (67%) 10 (63%) 16 (70%) 
Law practice with a government agency 6 (15%) 4 (25%) 2 (9%) 
Government service other than practice of law 3 (8%) 2 (13%) 1 (4%) 
Business or industry 2 (5%) 0 2 (9%) 
Other 2 (5%) 0 2 (9%) 
 
Table 25: Professional Activity Immediately Before Appointment 
 
 Overall 
District 
Judges 
Circuit 
Judges 
Private practice of law 26 (67%) 10 (63%) 16 (70%) 
Government service other than practice of law  9 (24%) 3 (19%) 5 (25%) 
Law practice with a government agency 8 (22%) 5 (31%) 3 (15%) 
Business or industry 2 (5%) 1 (6%) 1 (5%) 
Other 2 (5%) 0 2 (10%) 
 
Although private practice is the predominant activity in both tables and 
the principal professional activity for the majority of judges prior to judicial 
service, other professional activities (combined) increased as primary 
immediately before appointment. This change was due largely to a shift 
prior to appointment, mostly among the circuit judges, from private 
practice into government service, with several serving as state court judges. 
C. The Questionnaire Survey 
1. Regular Active Service vs. Senior Status 
Turning to the core of the questionnaire, we asked the judges what in-
fluenced them to remain in regular active service rather than take senior 
status. Table 26 reports their responses in descending order by overall mean. 
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Table 26: Remaining in Regular Active Service  
Rather Than Taking Senior Status 
 
 
Overall 
Means 
District Judge 
Means 
Circuit Judge 
Means 
I want to participate in en banc 
hearings 
5.6 N/A 5.6 
I want to retain the 
staff/staffing level 
5.4 5.7 5.1 
I want to keep my chambers 5.3 5.8 4.8 
I want to keep a full caseload 5.1 5.0 5.1 
I want to keep my own 
courtroom 
4.7 4.7 N/A 
I do not want to surrender my 
seniority for the purposes of 
presiding, opinion assignment, 
ceremonial occasions, etc. 
4.6 N/A 4.6 
I want to participate fully in 
court or Circuit administration 
4.1 4.4 3.8 
I want to ensure that I get my 
fair share of good cases 
4.0 4.4 3.6 
I am concerned that the bar or 
the public may view senior 
judges as not full Article III 
judges 
2.7 2.8 2.3 
I am concerned that senior 
status may adversely affect my 
relationships with colleagues 
2.5 2.4 2.6 
I plan to take senior status but 
am waiting for a different 
appointing authority (i.e., a 
different political administra-
tion) to nominate my successor 
2.5 2.9 2.1 
I am concerned about the 
effect of taking senior status on 
my ability to attract law clerks 
2.5 2.6 2.4 
I regard the process of 
certification (for purposes of 
eligibility for a salary increase) 
as distasteful or demeaning 
2.2 3.0 1.6 
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I do not want to surrender my 
seniority for purposes of 
ceremonial occasions, etc. 
1.8 1.8 N/A 
 
The influences that circuit judges and district judges regard as important 
for staying in regular active service rather than taking senior status are 
strikingly parallel and accord with what we expected; the differences relate 
primarily to their different jobs. Clearly, the most important concerns of 
both groups relate to keeping their role and place in the judicial hierarchy—
a full caseload, staff, chambers. A district judge said, “I enjoy my work and I 
feel that I do a better job if I devote my full attention to my job. It’s 
difficult enough to keep up with the law as it is.”262  
Sometimes institutional considerations have influenced decisions to 
remain in regular active service. One district judge said, “It is the culture of 
my court not to take senior status when eligible (I believe [a number] of my 
colleagues senior to me are eligible for it but haven’t taken it). There is a 
perception, whether true or not, that one becomes a second-class-citizen at 
that juncture.”263 Another noted, “I plan to take Senior Status and would do 
so soon, but there are so many changes coming to our court, and I want to 
be prepared and staffed to help us through this unsettled period.”264 One 
judge noted that taking senior status would create an opportunity for an 
additional judge to be appointed to the court, when an additional judge was 
not needed;265 another made the opposite point that taking senior status 
would, in the current situation, result in that judge not being replaced.266 A 
third judge has “waited for [the] vacancy backlog to diminish.”267  
Concerns about a court’s current ideology generally or the management 
of the court under the current chief judge specifically268 surfaced in the res-
ponses to this questionnaire, as they did in the responses to the questionnaire 
 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. Another respondent, noting that district judges require greater resources than circuit 
judges, suggested as disincentives to assuming senior status: courtroom sharing, the loss of full 
court reporter credit even if the judge in senior status carries a full load, and loss of the judge’s 
docket clerk. See Letter from a district judge to S. Jay Plager, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fed. Circuit ( July 2, 2010) (on file with authors). 
265 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. One recurrent institutional and personal consideration, to which we were also alerted 
by responses to the senior status questionnaire, was the desire to remain chief judge. 
268 Cf. Feinberg, supra note 162, at 385 (“I do not suggest that a chief judge alone can create 
such a spirit [of collegiality], although he could undoubtedly substantially impair it.”). 
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sent to judges in senior status. Thus, a circuit judge said, “I want to work 
full time. In dealing with the current management of my court, it’s better to 
be an active judge.”269 Another circuit judge observed: “My court is a total 
dysfunctional mess. I hope every day to try and improve things, but 
everything is partisan—who appointed you—it’s sick.”270 
Consistent with perceptions of their role, circuit judges reported being 
most influenced by the desire to continue participating in en banc hearings. 
Less influential, but still important to circuit judges, was the opportunity to 
preside in court and to control opinion assignments. As one judge put it: 
“It’s a fun job! And presiding and assigning cases is important to me.”271 An 
important concern of the district judges was keeping their own courtrooms.  
The circuit judges’ concern about en banc participation raises a number 
of questions. It is certainly true that, in theory at least, one of the major 
vehicles for creating new or particularly important law at the circuit level is 
through en banc hearings and subsequent opinions. On the other hand, with 
one exception, en bancs involve all circuit judges in regular active service,272 
so that any one judge’s ability to influence or control a particular outcome is 
heavily diluted. Participants in en banc arguments held with the full 
panoply of judges present are aware that the arguments can be hard to 
focus, and sometimes become more a debate among the judges than a 
hearing with counsel.273 For these reasons, among others, some judges 
routinely resist efforts to have their court take cases en banc, and, anecdot-
ally at least, some judges count among the advantages of senior status that 
they can avoid involvement in en bancs. 
There is another way to think about the issue of en banc participation. 
Although a judge in senior status who was on the original panel may 
participate as a member of an en banc court once it is established, the judge 
may not participate in the vote to take the panel’s decision en banc, or be 
counted as a vote against doing so. To the extent that being able to vote 
 
269 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 As authorized by Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (1978), the Ninth Circuit 
sits en banc with eleven judges, drawn by lot. A judge in senior status who was on the panel “may 
elect to be eligible to be selected as a member of the en banc court.” 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDERS 
§ 5.1.a.4, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/rules/general_orders/general 
_orders11_11.pdf. For a description of the Ninth Circuit’s en banc process and its unique use of a 
judge as en banc coordinator, see Stephen L. Wasby, “A Watchdog for the Good of the Order”: The 
Ninth Circuit’s En Banc Coordinator, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS. 91 (2011). 
273 See Feinberg, supra note 162, at 376-77 (“They consume an enormous amount of time and 
often do little to clarify the law.”). 
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against taking and overturning a case en banc is important, remaining in 
regular active service is the only way to preserve that power.  
We sought insight on these issues by examining data about the frequency 
of en bancs in the circuit courts. Table 27 is a snapshot of a decade’s worth 
(2000–2009) of appeals terminated on the merits after en banc review, 
compared with the number of overall merits terminations and authorized 
judgeships. The table lists the circuits in order of en banc terminations on 
the merits, of which there were a total of 623 in the decade, and displays the 
rankings of the other two factors.274 
 
Table 27: En Banc Terminations, 2000–2009 
 
Circuit 
En Banc 
Terminations 
Total Merits 
Terminations 
Authorized 
Judgeships 
Ninth 1 (180) 1 (56,386) 1 (29) 
Eighth 2 (73) 8 (19,467) 8 (11) (tie) 
Fifth. 3 (65) 2 (41,406) 2 (17) 
Sixth 4 (59) 5 (25,855) 3 (16) 
Eleventh 5 (55) 3 (34,669) 7 (12) 
Fourth 6 (47) 4 (26,706) 4 (15) 
Tenth 7 (46) 10 (14,946) 7 (12) 
Federal 8 (37) 12 (8791) 7 (12) 
Third 9 (33) 7 (20,839) 5 (14) 
Seventh 10 (26) 9 (15,106) 8 (11) (tie) 
First 11 (17) 11 (8808) 9 (6) 
D.C. 12 (17) 12 (5519) 8 (11) (tie) 
Second 13 (5) 6 (24,552) 6 (13) 
 
Given the high value that circuit judge respondents placed on participa-
tion in en bancs, one might think that they dominate in circuit court 
decisionmaking. As the table shows, that is not the case. Overall, en banc 
terminations were 0.2% of total merits terminations. On the other hand, 
these data tell us little about the number of votes for an en banc that failed. 
 
274 The termination data are derived from Table S-1 in the annual statistics published by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, U.S. 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). For 
the data concerning authorized judgeships, see U.S. COURTS, supra note 113. 
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As previously noted, the ability to vote against an en banc hearing may be 
as valuable to a given judge as participation in such a hearing.  
It might be expected that the salience of en banc review as a choice-
influencing consideration would be reflected in its frequency. The Ninth 
Circuit, using its own special en banc procedure, far outnumbers the other 
circuits in en bancs, as it does in total terminations overall. By contrast, 
there were no en banc reviews in the Second Circuit in eight of the ten 
years between 2000 and 2009. If a circuit court has a culture of judges 
promptly assuming senior status (as opposed to remaining in regular active 
service)—as the Second Circuit does (or did)—it may be linked to a culture 
of discouraging en banc review.275 In the Federal Circuit, the total of 37 en 
banc terminations for the decade was skewed by one year (2000) when there 
were 14. 
The frequency of en banc review may also reflect the risk of inconsistent 
decisions that is attributable to the size of the circuit or to ideological 
divisions. As to size, the Ninth Circuit was responsible for almost 30% of all 
en banc terminations during the decade. As to ideological divisions, which 
may independently impart salience to en banc review, a recently published 
study of the Ninth Circuit’s en banc process observes that in the mid-1970s 
“calls to rehear cases en banc often resulted from other judges’ unhappiness 
at decisions by the two most liberal judges, Walter Ely and Shirley 
Hufstedler, or from Judge Hufstedler as to rulings by the court’s more 
conservative majority.”276 In a similar vein, a December 2008 article in The 
Washington Post reported that Republican appointees to the Sixth Circuit 
“have repeatedly organized full-court rehearings [en banc review] to over-
turn rulings by panels dominated by Democratic appointees.”277  
2. Regular Active Service vs. Retirement 
We turn to the considerations that influence judges in regular active 
service to remain on the bench rather than retire altogether. Table 28 
presents these data.  
 
  
 
275 See supra text accompanying note 185. 
276 Wasby, supra note 272, at 96. 
277 R. Jeffrey Smith, The Politics of the Federal Bench: GOP-Appointed Majorities Winning 
Ideological Battles at Appellate Level, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2008, at A1. See generally Christopher P. 
Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the “Mini-Supreme Court,” 13 J. L. & POL. 377 (1997). 
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Table 28: Reasons for Remaining in Regular Active Service 
Rather Than Retiring From Office 
 
 Overall 
District 
Judges 
Circuit 
Judges 
I like the judicial work of a 
judge 
6.6 6.8 6.3 
I like the working conditions 
of a judge 
5.9 6.1 5.7 
I view this as a lifetime 
position (or until I am unable 
to fulfill the duties of a judge) 
5.7 5.9 5.6 
I like my colleagues 5.3 5.5 5.1 
I am not interested in the 
typical professional activities 
of retired judges 
4.3 3.7 4.8 
I enjoy the respect shown to a 
judge 
4.2 4.8 3.5 
I do not know what I would do 
if I retired from judicial office 
3.9278 4.1 4.0 
I like the administrative work 
of a judge 
3.4 4.1 2.8 
I intend to retire but am 
waiting for a different 
appointing authority (i.e., a 
different political administra-
tion) to nominate my successor 
1.9 2.6 1.5 
 
These data can be compared with the responses of judges in senior sta-
tus to the question why they remained in senior status rather than retire.279 
We put the same eight propositions to both groups of judges, adding for the 
judges in regular active service a proposition concerning strategic partisan 
retirement. These eight propositions are the first eight listed in Table 28; 
strategic partisan motivation had the least influence and appears in the 
ranking at the bottom of the table. 
Although the strength of the responses to these propositions is not iden-
tical for the two groups, and thus their order in the two tables differs, the 
 
278 This apparent anomaly results from including a response in the “Overall” mean—from a 
judge of the Court of International Trade—that is not included in the other means. 
279 See supra Table 9. 
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respondents to the two questionnaires agreed on the most important 
influence—the overall mean for “I like the judicial work of a judge” turned 
out to be the same, 6.6, for both the judges in regular active service and the 
judges in senior status. In both sets of responses district judges accorded 
this influence slightly greater strength than circuit judges.  
Both groups then ranked the next three possible influences more or less 
together: liking the working conditions of a judge, viewing judging as a 
lifetime position, and liking their colleagues, although not in exactly the 
same order. Interestingly, as Table 28 shows, for judges in regular active 
service the overall means for these next three influences drop noticeably 
from the most important, with none gaining a 6.0 or above. This finding 
contrasts with the responses of the judges in senior status, who gave all 
three of these influences overall means above 6.0. Among possible influ-
ences not listed, one judge wryly noted that he was “waiting for the ignored 
salary increase” to retire.280  
As with respondents to our senior status questionnaire, we hypothesized 
that the greater degree of autonomy that district judges enjoy in their 
judicial and administrative work would lead to greater satisfaction with that 
work. Whereas the differences in means as to both of the pertinent proposi-
tions are statistically significant for judges in senior status, for the judges 
remaining in regular active service they only approach statistical signifi-
cance (p = .06, p = .07). We also again predicted that the nature and 
frequency of district judges’ interactions with colleagues, the bar, litigants, 
and the public would yield higher means for propositions probing collegial 
relationships and professional respect. The differences in means as to both 
are statistically significant for judges in senior status. Although the same is 
true for judges remaining in regular active service as to enjoying profession-
al respect (p = .05), there was no significant difference as to collegial 
relationships. 
After these four possible influences, there is a noticeable drop in the 
strength of the remainder in both sets of responses. Neither group thought 
that the continued opportunity to do administrative work was a reason not 
to retire, and both groups were somewhat mixed about whether they would 
know what to do if they retired (both reported an overall mean of 3.9). As 
one of the district judges commented, “I simply do not know anything to do 
outside of a courtroom.”281 
 
280 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. Another judge observed that “a retired judge 
does not receive COLAs, if any.” Id. 
281 Id. 
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Consistent with our other findings with respect to strategic partisan 
retirement, the judges in regular active service gave that consideration their 
lowest overall mean score, although, contrary to what we expected, the 
district judges seemed to think it a stronger influence, and the difference in 
means approaches statistical significance (p = .06). Interestingly, among 
these respondents strategic partisan considerations appear to play a larger, 
even if still small, influence in decisions about taking senior status (overall 
mean 2.5) than in decisions about retiring (1.9). Such considerations seemed 
to have had a greater salience for judges appointed by Republican presi-
dents, and the differences in means for the pertinent questions as to both 
senior status and retirement were statistically significant (p = .05, p = .03). 
In a contrary sense, as some of the comments noted previously illustrate, 
politics—defined in terms of internal disputes within a court, whether the 
result of personal or political differences—were among the influences that 
keep some of these judges in regular active service. 
Finally, we also asked, “In general, how satisfied are you with your deci-
sion to remain in regular active service?” The overall mean response was 
6.5, with a mean of 6.7 for district judges and 6.3 for circuit judges. These 
numbers are very close to the mean responses to the comparable question 
we posed to judges in senior status, which were 6.5 for district court judges 
and 6.4 for circuit judges. 
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
A. Resignation 
When service until death was the primary way a federal judge without 
independent means could have a measure of financial security, the alterna-
tive of resignation appealed to some for whom that prospect proved 
unacceptable, or for whom a relatively cloistered life of public service was 
itself a reason to resign.282 The advent of retirement from the office, senior 
status, and disability retirement have fundamentally changed the landscape 
in which decisions to resign are made. Particularly after Congress instituted 
the Rule of 80 in 1984 and made it applicable to retirement as well as 
service in senior status, most federal judges, whose average age at appoint-
ment has remained stable at around age fifty, simply have had too much to 
 
282 See Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals, supra note 6, at 346-47, 408-10 (providing 
reasons for resignations from 1790 to 1869). 
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lose by resigning. Thus, the fact that resignation rates in the period of our 
study have been at historic lows was to be expected. 
This perspective also illuminates two of our other findings about resig-
nations. First, we should not be surprised that some who are committed to a 
life of public service find the call to other positions in that service adequate 
reason to resign, particularly if the call comes from the President or if it 
involves changing one role for another at greater salary.283 Second, the 
younger federal judges are when they regret their decision to accept the 
financial sacrifices of their office or the “relatively cloistered life of public 
service” it entails, the more empowered to change careers they are likely to 
feel. The phenomenon is akin to that affecting decisions to retire, or likely 
to affect them in the future, which we discuss below. We believe it helps to 
explain our finding that federal judges appointed at younger than average 
ages are more likely to resign.284 
Some scholars believe that younger appointments are a means by which 
a president may try to ensure the enduring influence of a judicial appoint-
ment agenda, particularly if it is a policy agenda. Whatever the effectiveness 
of such a strategy for Supreme Court appointments,285 which entail a very 
different incentive structure, our findings about resignations and the 
concerns our data elicit about retirements suggest that it may not be 
effective for other Article III appointments. To be sure, resignations are not 
a big enough feature of the present landscape to warrant a change in 
presidential appointment strategy, and we doubt they ever will. To the 
extent that financial considerations drive resignations today—our data 
indicate that they play a larger role than in the past286—and in the absence 
of a change in congressional compensation policy and practices, we tend to 
agree with those who identify as the primary concern their effect on the 
pool of those who aspire to federal judicial service.287 The same may not be 
true of retirements. 
 
283 See supra text accompanying note 69. 
284 See supra text accompanying note 84. 
285 See Stephen B. Burbank. Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme 
Court Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511, 1515-16 (2006) (finding little empirical support for use of 
such a strategy in appointments to the Supreme Court). 
286 See supra text accompanying notes 75 & 82. 
287 See supra note 154. 
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B. Retirement 
Responses to our questionnaire revealed that the two most important 
influences on retirement, whether or not preceded by senior status, are the 
desire for more income and the desire for new challenges.288 Both should be 
sensitive to length of service, and one of them may also be sensitive to age 
at appointment. The longer a federal judge and that judge’s family must 
make the sacrifices required, the more powerful the desire to change careers 
is likely to be, at least in some areas of the country (with high costs of 
living) and for some families (because of compensation policy and practices 
like those of the last twenty years). Moreover, a judge appointed at forty 
must serve for twenty-five years to assume senior status or retire, compared 
with fifteen years for a judge appointed at the average age. We deem the 
former more likely than the latter to desire new challenges at age sixty-five. 
Given only a small increase in the rate of retirement over the four dec-
ades of our study,289 why worry? First, the responses to both the retired and 
senior status questionnaires reveal widespread unhappiness about compen-
sation policy and practices, and about the attitudes of members of Congress 
they are deemed to reflect. These feelings may be eroding the institutional 
loyalty and commitment to public service that are also evident in those 
responses. Indeed, a number of respondents to the senior status question-
naire told us that they were considering retirement, while others made it 
clear that they would have retired had they known what the compensation 
policy and practices would be when they chose senior status. 
Second, the compensation policy and practices of the past two decades 
have substantially reduced the financial advantages that senior status once 
enjoyed over retirement. Third, and perhaps most important, whether the 
source of an eligible federal judge’s consideration of retirement is financial 
distress, accumulated frustration about lack of respect from Congress, the 
desire for new challenges, or some more idiosyncratic reason, that judge is 
making the decision in a world that in at least two pertinent respects is not 
the world that existed a generation ago. 
“Our sixty-five is not our parents’ sixty-five” is more than wishful think-
ing; it is a well-documented fact. We are living longer, healthier lives and 
are less afflicted by disability at older ages than previous generations.290 
Numerous studies indicate declining rates of functional and cognitive 
 
288 See supra Tables 21 & 22. 
289 See supra Table 13. 
290 See WAN HE ET AL., supra note 61, at 1. 
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limitations, including a downward trend in disability since the early 
1980s.291 Another study found that “workers age 60 and older are half as 
likely as their nonworking counterparts to report that they are in fair to 
poor health. They are also almost two times more likely to report that they 
are in very good to excellent health.”292 
With the lowering of the eligibility age to sixty-five (assuming fifteen 
years of service) in 1984, and the continued progress in health and health-
care over the last thirty years, most federal judges who were appointed at 
the average age have better reason to think that they are up to the challenges 
of a new career than their predecessors. In addition, the new career that 
most retired federal judges seem to favor—ADR—essentially did not exist 
thirty years ago. Without it, the changes in the legal profession that led one 
judge we interviewed to observe that “many sixty-five year old lawyers are 
depressed”293 might deter a move driven by the desire for new challenges, if 
not one driven by the desire for more income. Even in a firm, however, 
specializing in ADR permits a retired judge to continue using the skills and 
experience of a judge and presumably relieves some of the rainmaking 
pressure that causes many lawyers to lament the course of the profession. 
There may be no need to take that risk, however. By joining an ADR 
provider, federal judges with the right experience can avoid law firm 
pressures and law firm culture, work as much or as little as they wish, and 
earn multiples of their judicial salary.294 
For these reasons, we are concerned that increasing numbers of federal 
judges, at an increasing rate, will choose to retire upon becoming eligible or 
soon thereafter, many of them after a short transitional period in senior 
status. Indeed, retirements over the last two years (our study period ended 
in 2009) suggest that the rate is increasing, perhaps substantially.295 Were 
 
291 Id. at 60. 
292 Id. at 91 (quoting Kristen Kilker & Laura Summers, Who Are Young Retirees and Older 
Workers?, DATA PROFILES: YOUNG RETIREES AND OLDER WORKERS (Nat’l Acad. Aging 
Soc’y), June 2000, at 3, available at http://www.agingsociety.org/agingsociety/pdf/aarp1.pdf). 
293 See supra text accompanying note 231. 
294 The information in this sentence is based on a confidential interview with an officer of 
one large ADR provider. That individual told us that not all federal judges who apply are accepted 
and that the provider is looking for certain types of expertise or experience, such as complex 
litigation or patent litigation. Such criteria may help to explain why retirements from the district 
courts are not evenly distributed, with disproportionate levels in the District of New Jersey, the 
Northern District of Illinois, and the Central District of California. See supra Figure 7.  
295 In 2010 and 2011, a total of 18 judges retired (8 in 2010 and 10 in 2011). This does not 
include a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit who retired in 2010. 
See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 54. Using the average annual number of 
eligible judges from the 2000s (556), which is surely somewhat low, the retirement rate for those 
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that to occur, the country would lose the benefits of the work, experience, 
and wisdom these judges could provide, either by continuing in regular 
active service or assuming and remaining in senior status.  
If, as we fear, the rate of retirement is likely to increase; if, as we expect, 
Congress and the Executive have little appetite to increase substantially the 
number of authorized judgeships; and if, as we believe our data confirm, 
service in senior status is both essential to the functioning of the federal 
judiciary and justified in cost-benefit terms quite apart from the appetites of 
the political branches, the country should pursue policies and fashion 
institutional arrangements that are designed to prevent retirements from 
subverting senior status. 
One possible structural step would be to return to the system of differ-
ent age and service requirements for senior status and retirement, by 
keeping the Rule of 80 for the former and returning to the rule that 
governed retirement from 1869 until 1984 (age seventy and ten years of 
service). Certainly, very little thought seems to have gone into the congres-
sional decision in 1984 to equate the requirements.296 
There are, however, serious potential problems associated with that step. 
The concerns include, from an institutional perspective, whether delaying 
eligibility to retire might make it harder to recruit good candidates to serve 
as federal judges, particularly when eligibility for a pension annuity is an 
all-or-nothing proposition. 
We do not see a compelling normative argument against such a change 
from the perspective of individual judges, except on behalf of those who 
accepted appointment under the current system. With or without the 
exception, however, delaying eligibility could only further erode the morale 
of the federal judiciary, with costs not easily estimable. Moreover, even if 
not compelling, an argument against reversion to the pre-1984 regime that 
viewed the economic opportunities of retirement as a form of delayed 
compensation, mitigating if not justifying inadequate compensation for 
regular active service, is both predictable and understandable. 
Of course, when the policy goal is to prevent retirements from subvert-
ing senior status, the most obvious step is to address the problems that most 
 
two years would be 1.62%, compared to the 2000s average of 0.88% (Table 13). In absolute terms, 
whereas an average of 4.9 judges retired annually in the 2000s, the average over the past two years 
is 9. 
296 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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directly create that risk.297 A good deal of evidence suggests that, still today, 
most federal judges believe that theirs should be a lifetime position, and 
that the erosion we see is due to a combination of financial hardship (for 
some) and frustration that hard work under restrictions unique to the 
judiciary is not valued (for many). As one judge we interviewed observed, 
“In a substantial case involving the government, the judge is likely to be the 
lowest paid lawyer in the courtroom.” 
Congress could stop the erosion by relieving the hardship and demon-
strating the respect that is due a separate and independent branch of 
government and the appreciation that is due federal judges, most of whom 
work hard for what is widely considered to be inadequate compensation. 
Understanding that today’s Congress may be in no mood to take such 
advice on faith, we turn to the role that senior status plays in today’s 
landscape, and to its benefits and costs. 
C. Senior Status 
This is a story of institutional evolution and adaptation. The federal 
judiciary has changed dramatically since the Founding. Scholars may debate 
whether the resources available to accomplish the work of the federal 
judiciary have declined since 1970.298 There can be no question, however, 
that the volume of the work, judicial and administrative, has increased 
substantially and that the only human resource envisioned by the Founders 
for accomplishing it—Article III judges in regular active service—has 
played a diminishing role. 
The architects of service in senior status could not have contemplated 
that judges in senior status would do a great deal of work, as there apparently 
was no thought that they would have chambers, staff or, in the case of 
 
297 In thinking about ways to diminish the appeal of retirement, we considered a policy of 
appointing older individuals, which might well have a number of benefits but does not seem 
achievable (or, unless legislated, enforceable). We also note a recent article advocating a 
prohibition against practice by federal judges who have resigned or retired. See Mary L. Clark, 
Judicial Retirement and Return to Practice, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 841 (2011). Two aspects of the 
proposal that we deem problematic are the fact that it is predicated on “guaranteeing retired 
judges regular pension increases,” id. at 904, and would not extend to “service as a neutral 
arbitrator or mediator.” Id. at 900. 
298 See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement of 
Statutory and Administrative Law in the United States (and Other Common Law Countries) 19-21 (U. 
Pa. L. Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 11-08, 2011), available at http//ssrn.com/abstract= 
1781047 (noting doubts about underfunding expressed by some scholars but elaborating reasons 
why reliance on docket statistics is inadequate). 
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district judges in senior status, a courtroom.299 Rather, it appears that the 
proponents of senior status, both in the judiciary and in Congress, imagined 
a corps of experienced judges who could help in the event of emergencies. 
Moreover, that view of senior status appears to have endured for decades. 
For instance, recall the 1944 anecdote about judges in senior status showing 
up in courtrooms when not needed.300 Presumably those courtrooms were 
assigned to judges in regular active service. 
The situation must have changed shortly thereafter, and with it attitudes 
toward the role and value of judges in senior status. We draw this inference 
from 1948 legislation favoring senior judges over retired judges by accord-
ing them the salary of the judicial office.301 Moreover, it is an inescapable 
inference from the 1950 action of the Judicial Conference authorizing the 
circuits to provide judges in senior status with chambers and staff in return 
for “substantial judicial work,”302 the 1954 legislation decoupling the age and 
service requirements for senior status from those for retirement,303 and the 
explanation given in support of the 1958 legislation that changed the 
designation from “retired judge” to “senior judge.”304 As far back as 1959, 
Chief Justice Warren told the members of the American Law Institute that 
“[i]f it were not for many of the [judges in senior status] who continue to 
serve so faithfully, we would indeed be in a terrible condition.”305 In 1986, 
Chief Justice Burger, in stressing the wisdom and experience of judges in 
senior status, seems to have assumed that Congress understood that.306 
In 1984, Wilfred Feinberg, then the chief judge of the Second Circuit, 
observed that judges in senior status “are a precious resource whose welfare 
and health must be every chief judge’s concern.”307 Today, however, the 
institutional perspective on service in senior status has all but obscured the 
individual perspective. Perhaps, given our findings, that is no surprise. 
Judges in senior status have constituted an increasing percentage of Article 
 
299 See supra text accompanying notes 165-67. 
300 See supra text accompanying note 94. 
301 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 294, 371, 372, 62 Stat. 869, 901, 903-4; supra text 
accompanying note 38. 
302 See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 168, at 21-22; supra text accompanying note 168. 
303 See Act of February 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 294, § 4, 68 Stat. 8, 12-13; supra text accompa-
nying note 39. 
304 See H.R. REP. NO. 85-171, at 4 (1957); supra text accompanying note 216. 
305 Earl A. Warren, Chief Justice, Address Before the American Law Institute (May 20, 
1959), in 36 A.L.I. PROC. 27, 41 (1959). 
306 See supra text accompanying note 133. 
307 Feinberg, supra note 162, at 375. 
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III judges since the 1980s, and they have performed an increasingly large 
share of the judicial work of the district courts and courts of appeals, at the 
same time easing the administrative burdens of judges in regular active 
service. 
When Congress was considering changes in the arrangements for service 
in senior status in 1989, a representative of the federal judiciary estimated 
that it would require 80 additional judges in regular active service to 
perform the case work then done by judges in senior status.308 As part of the 
research for this study, we sought to bring that estimate up to date as of 
2009.309 
For the district courts, there were 678 authorized judgeships (including 
temporary judgeships) and 651 judges in regular active service in December 
2009. The latter accounted for 78.8% of case terminations in 2009, while 
judges in senior status accounted for the other 21.2% (including 26.8% of all 
trials). It would require 174 district judges in regular active service to do the 
case work performed by judges in senior status in that year. Taking vacan-
cies into account, this translates into 147 additional authorized district court 
judgeships. 
For the regional courts of appeals, there were 167 authorized judgeships 
and 156 judges in regular active service in December 2009.310 Judges in 
regular active service accounted for 82.2% of appeals participations in 2009, 
while judges in senior status accounted for 17.8%. It would require 34 
additional circuit judges in regular active service to do the case work 
performed by circuit judges in senior status in 2009. Taking vacancies into 
account, this workload translates into 23 additional authorized circuit 
judgeships.  
Unless members of Congress (and some judges) were to change their 
attitudes toward the creation of additional federal judgeships, without a 
large corps of judges in senior status, the federal judiciary would collapse 
under the weight of its caseload. Put differently, whether or not members of 
 
308 See Judicial Independence—Discipline and Conduct: Hearings on H.R. 1620, H.R. 1930, and 
H.R. 2181 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 28 (1989) (statement of Frank M. Coffin, Senior J., U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit). 
309 We are indebted to the late Steven Schlesinger and his colleagues in the Statistics Divi-
sion of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for assistance in calculating these 
estimates. Note that because the appellate caseload data for judges in senior status includes only 
the regional courts of appeals, so do the data we use on authorized judgeships. 
310 See Judicial Facts and Figures 2009 tbl.2.1, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/JudicialFactsAndFigures2009.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
This total includes all circuit courts except the Federal Circuit. 
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Congress will admit it, they are relying on judges in senior status to take 
them off the hook for not authorizing an adequate number of judgeships. 
This perspective has led some to criticize senior status.311 
If Congress did not (or could not) rely on judges in senior status, the 
“efficiencies” that long ago elicited the concern of Judge Newman (and 
many others),312 and the bureaucratic turn to Article III surrogates that long 
ago elicited the concern of Judge Posner (and many others),313 would seem 
like near-perfect justice; civil trials would move from an endangered species 
to the verge of extinction, and representatives of the United States would 
have to stop lecturing abroad about the importance of courts to the Rule of 
Law, since access to the federal court system would be effectively a privilege 
of the wealthy. 
Indeed, if judges currently serving in senior status uniformly reduced 
their workload to 25% (but no further, in order to remain eligible for salary 
increases), the federal court system would be in very serious distress. 
Compared to judges in regular active service, on average district judges in 
senior status currently carry a workload of at least 50.3%, while circuit 
judges in senior status carry a workload of at least 45.1%—in other words, 
double or almost double the workload that Congress deemed sufficient to 
warrant eligibility for salary increases in 1989.314 
Moreover, apart from conducting 26.8% of all trials in 2009, judges in 
senior status were the workhorses of the intercircuit assignment system, 
never more important than today to the efficient resolution of docket crises, 
and central to the flexibility envisioned in the federal judiciary’s 2010 
Strategic Plan.315 Finally, district judges in senior status, who are particularly 
likely to have the experience and availability sought by the MDL panel, 
currently oversee 26.5% of the MDL dockets.316 Any substantial decrease in 
their availability for that service would again (as with intercircuit assign-
ments) strike hard at the federal judiciary’s ability to respond effectively to 
 
311 See Kelly J. Baker, Note, Senior Judges: Valuable Resources, Partisan Strategists, or Self-
Interested Maximizers?, 16 J.L. & POL. 139, 145 (2000) (discussing the criticism that senior status 
permits Congress to avoid politically difficult choices). 
312 See supra text accompanying note 108. 
313 See supra text accompanying note 101. 
314 Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, § 705, 103 Stat. 1716, 1770. In all circuits, 
maintaining a 25% caseload is also sufficient to entitle the judges in senior status to chambers and 
some staff. 
315 See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 223, at 8; supra text accompanying note 122. 
316 See supra text accompanying note 123. 
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the vagaries of the federal court docket, which for this purpose should be 
viewed from a national—not a local or regional—perspective. 
The value of the service provided by judges in senior status is hardly 
news. Since Judge Feinberg’s encomium, the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee cautioned that “[e]ffective federal court operations require maintain-
ing the incentives that the current senior judge system affords.”317 The 1995 
Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts observed that judges in senior 
status “provide an invaluable resource to the federal courts” and “should be 
treated with the respect and consideration befitting their experience and 
dedication to the law.”318 Noting what it called “a new and alarming trend 
for federal judges to leave the bench entirely when they reach retirement 
eligibility, rather than take senior status,” the plan argued that “[s]enior 
judges should suffer no discrimination upon assuming that status,” and that 
a “fair, responsive policy for utilizing this invaluable resource will deter” 
judges from remaining in regular active service beyond their time or 
“simply leav[ing] the bench altogether,” because of the fear of prejudicial 
policies.319 Having listed some indications “that the treatment of senior 
judges often ignores their important contributions,” the plan observed that 
“[i]n all these situations, senior judges should be treated, if practicable, as 
though they were active judges with the same seniority.”320 
Against this backdrop, the discussion of senior status in the federal judi-
ciary’s 2010 Strategic Plan seems tepid. To be sure, one strategy is to 
“[s]upport a lifetime of service for federal judges,” and one of its goals is to 
“[s]trengthen policies that encourage senior Article III judges to continue 
handling cases as long as they are willing and able,” while another goal is to 
“[s]eek the views of judges on practices that support their development, 
retention and morale.”321 Perhaps the difference in tone merely reflects dif-
ferences between a long-range plan and a strategic plan. Moreover, some of 
the specific recommendations concerning judges in senior status in the 1995 
Long Range Plan had already been adopted.322 We believe, however, that 
there is something else operating here, to wit, the cost-cutting pressures 
 
317 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 154 (1990). 
318 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 223, at 84.  
319 Id. at 100-01. 
320 Id. at 101. 
321 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 223, at 9. 
322 Thus, as recommended in the 1995 Long Range Plan, see supra text accompanying notes 
318-20, judges in senior status are now eligible to serve on the Judicial Conference, circuit judicial 
councils, and the Board of the Federal Judicial Center, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332(a)(3), 621(a)(2) 
(2006). 
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from Congress that drove the 2010 Strategic Plan’s discussion of achieving 
“the effective and efficient management of public resources,”323 and that led 
to a September 2011 “cost-containment ‘summit’ of chairs of Judicial 
Conference committees and members of the [Conference’s] Budget 
Committee and the Executive Committee.”324 
It remains true today, as envisioned in 1919 and again in 1944, that from 
an individual perspective, any work done by judges in senior status is work 
done for nothing (since they are entitled to the office and undiminished 
compensation for life whether or not they do any work).325 Once the federal 
judiciary started to rely on judges in senior status to do “substantial judicial 
work,” however, the provision of chambers and staff meant that the original 
assumption that the work of judges in senior status would also be costless 
from an institutional perspective no longer held true. In the current 
budgetary climate, avoiding measures that would cause substantial numbers 
of federal judges to prefer retirement or continued regular active service to 
senior status may require that Congress (and perhaps some members of the 
federal judiciary) be persuaded that, from an institutional perspective, 
judges in senior status are cost-effective. 
In order to determine whether that is true, we also requested from the 
AO data on the cost of federal judgeships.326 Accepting their accuracy, we 
calculated the annual recurring cost of supporting the actual number of 
judges that would be required to do the case work performed in 2009 by 
judges in senior status (assuming no salary increases or COLAs). At the 
district court level (174 judges), the cost would be approximately 
 
323 STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 223, at 8; see also id. (“Cost containment remains a high 
priority, and new initiatives to contain cost growth are under consideration.”). 
324 Hard Choices and Difficult Issues: The Judiciary Considers Its Financial Future, THIRD 
BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts), Oct. 2011, at 1. 
325 It is widely, but erroneously, asserted that a judge must carry a 25% workload in order to 
remain in senior status. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 107, at 28 (citing Stras & Scott, supra note 217, 
at 470); Yoon, supra note 152, at 515; Stephen J. Choi et al., The Law and Policy of Judicial 
Retirement 3 (N.Y. Univ. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 11-12, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1792422. 
Alas, even the Congressional Research Service has misunderstood the effects of the Ethics 
Reform Act of 1989, repeating the myth that “[e]ach year, senior status judges must handle the 
equivalent of 25% of the caseload of an active judge or serve the federal judiciary in an administra-
tive capacity.” RUTKUS, supra note 129, at 11. The requirement in question pertains exclusively to 
salary increases. 
326 See Cost of Establishing a New Judgeship—Fiscal Year 2013 (May 23, 2011) (on file with 
authors). Data on the costs of regular active judgeships (as estimated at that time) had previously 
been provided to Congress. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 110-427, at 17 (2008) (supplemental and minority 
views). 
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$175,872,000. At the court of appeals level (34 judges), it would be approxi-
mately $32,057,000. The total annual recurring cost would be approximately 
$207,929,000. 
 Although the AO also provided us with cost data for the positions held 
by judges in senior status, they set at zero the costs for space and facilities 
and security.327 We have thus far been unsuccessful in securing an under-
standable explanation for zeroing out those costs. Let us assume, at the 
other extreme, that the space and facilities and security costs of judges in 
senior status with chambers and staff are identical to those of judges in 
regular active service. If that were true, the total annual recurring cost of 
the 77 circuit and 279 district court judges so situated in September 2009 
would be approximately $226,737,000 (not including the salaries and benefits 
of the judges, which must be paid in any event), or approximately 
$19,000,000 more than the cost of the judges in regular active service needed 
to do an equivalent amount of case work. 
If, however, we hold the space and facilities costs constant but accept the 
security cost as zero on the theory that judges in senior status are not in fact 
adding to the expense that would have to be incurred to protect judges in 
regular active service (an argument that is harder to accept as to space and 
facilities), the total annual recurring cost of judges in senior status (again 
excluding salary and benefits) would be approximately $193,919,000. This is 
approximately $13,000,000 less than the cost of the judges in regular active 
service who would be required to do the case work currently performed by 
judges in senior status. 
Of course, these estimates are based on other estimates, and the process 
involves numerous assumptions, some of which are contestable. Moreover, 
this replacement cost analysis does not account for the contributions that 
judges in senior status make to the administration of their own courts, their 
circuits, and the institutional federal judiciary. That those contributions 
have nontrivial value is suggested by the recognition that administrative 
work qualifies for eligibility for salary increases.328 Indeed, even within the 
domain of case work, the analysis does not account for the special value that 
visiting judges serving in senior status bring to the management of caseload 
backlogs caused by vacancies, periodic surges in cases, or other phenomena, 
and to the increasingly important MDL process. Securing equivalent 
 
327 See Cost of Establishing a New Judgeship—Fiscal Year 2013 (May 19, 2011) (on file with 
authors). Both sets of data provided by the AO include costs for staff (“supporting personnel”) 
that are based on historical experience. 
328 See 28 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1)(D) (2006); supra text accompanying notes 43-44. 
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flexibility exclusively from a corps of judges in regular active service 
probably would require more of them, perhaps many more, than the simple 
calculation presented above suggests.  
Whether the focus is casework or administrative work, as Chief Justice 
Burger stressed in 1986,329 the contributions of judges in senior status are 
not merely quantitative, substituting for work that would otherwise have to 
be done by judges in regular active service. Wisdom and experience are 
hard to quantify, but they are hardly irrelevant to a notion of efficiency that 
takes an adequately capacious view of costs. 
Finally, the analysis thus far looks at the cost/benefit ques-
tion exclusively from an institutional perspective, ignoring the dual 
perspective that the history of senior status suggests is appropriate. In 
particular, it ignores the perspective of the individual judge in senior status. 
As a respondent to one of our questionnaires observed,  
For senior status to ‘work’ as intended, both for the courts and the individ-
ual judge, the judge must continue to feel part of a common judicial effort. 
This means that senior judges must continue to be afforded the support 
necessary to practice at peak efficiency (or whatever reduced efficiency suits 
the judge).330 
Both the extraordinary sensitivity of judges in senior status to financial 
incentives revealed by the FICA experience in the 1980s331 and responses to 
our senior status questionnaire suggest that Congress could repair much of 
the damage caused by the compensation policy and practices of the past two 
decades by providing for federal judges in general to regain and hold 
ground lost to inflation. This solution would involve, first, increasing 
federal judicial salaries by the amount necessary to restore the purchasing 
power that judges have lost, and, second, making the changes necessary to 
ensure that federal judges received COLAs automatically in the future.  
In doing so, Congress would repair both financial damage and damage 
to morale caused by the perception of repeated breaches of faith arising 
from the pre-enactment history of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. In the 
process, it would also avert some of the perverse incentives caused by 
current compensation policy and practices, such as the influence of that 
policy and those practices on some judges to take senior status before they 
 
329 See supra text accompanying note 133. 
330 Letter from a district judge to S. Jay Plager, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit ( July 2, 2010) (on file with authors). 
331 See supra text accompanying notes 132-34. 
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would prefer to do so; on other judges, seeking income from teaching, to 
provide less judicial service than they would be willing and able to provide; 
and on still other judges to remain in senior status and seek annual certifica-
tion past the point that they should stop working at the required level. 
Our study reveals that, apart from compensation, some nonfinancial 
policies and practices may influence decisions to leave or forego senior 
status for retirement, or to remain in regular active service. We understand 
that the judiciary has decided to revisit the question whether chambers and 
staff criteria should vary geographically or whether there should be national 
standards.332 We also understand that there are plausible arguments for each 
system. Reconsideration seems warranted in light of the goal of “in-
creas[ing] the flexibility of the judiciary in matching resources to workload.” 
That goal might be better served by national than by regional or local 
criteria for assigning chambers and staff, particularly when judges in senior 
status are responsible for so much of the work accomplished through 
intercircuit assignment. Regional or local choices about matters consequen-
tial to the career choices of federal judges may also have national conse-
quences. At the same time, there may be enough variation in workload, 
staffing, availability of judges, and other factors that flexibility in accommo-
dating regional or local conditions should be incorporated into any national 
standards.  
As we have noted, space and staff are of greater concern to district judges 
than to circuit judges because for the former, “space” includes courtrooms 
and “staff” includes courtroom staff. Courtroom sharing for district judges 
in senior status in new courthouse construction is already Judicial Confer-
ence policy.333 Particularly since the extent of such construction going 
forward is in doubt, the more insistent question is what measure, if any, of 
courtroom sharing should be required for existing courthouses. For some 
courts (typically with newer courthouses), the matter does not come up. For 
others, space demands are such that all district judges must share court-
rooms. We cannot object to a child of necessity.  
What should be of concern is the possibility that, as a result of cost-
cutting pressures, existing capacity might be taken offline, with concomitant 
demands for more court sharing by district judges in senior status.334 With 
all the attention given in recent decades to the importance of a firm, 
 
332 We implied a similar question about using anything other than a national standard as the 
denominator for certifying eligibility for salary increases. See supra text accompanying note 164. 
333 See supra text accompanying note 176. 
334 See Hard Choices, supra note 324, at 11. 
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credible trial date, in a landscape where civil trials are already an endan-
gered species, and given the high percentage of all trials for which judges in 
senior status have been responsible in recent years, it would be hard not to 
see such a move as another signal that trial, even when covered by the 
Seventh Amendment, is disfavored. That may already be the message if 
there are courts in which status as a district judge in senior status adversely 
affects entitlement to courtroom space or staff, even if that judge is carrying 
a full workload. No wonder that a respondent to our active judge question-
naire reported a culture against assuming senior status because “[t]here is a 
perception, whether true or not, that one becomes a second-class-citizen at 
that juncture.”335  
It appears plain that the equality urged by the 1995 Long Range Plan 
has yet to be uniformly achieved. Prejudicial treatment concerning court-
room sharing and courtroom staff is one area of concern. As another, even 
though that plan urged that no distinction be made in the titles used by 
judges in regular active service and judges in senior status (unless the judge 
in senior status so desired), “Senior Circuit Judge” is still used as the 
designation in written opinions in a few circuits. More important, responses 
to our questionnaire revealed that some judges in senior status—not many 
and concentrated in a few circuits—believe that they have been treated 
inappropriately.336 Responses to the active judge questionnaire similarly 
revealed that some others—again, not many—have remained in regular 
active service at least in part because of the fear of prejudicial treatment if 
they were in senior status.337 These comments and concerns may deserve 
further inquiry.338 
Determining whether there is evidence of abuse in the exercise of the 
designation and assignment power requires formulating the concept of 
“abuse.” Chief judges, circuit or district, have no power to insist on any 
amount of work from judges in senior status, although the latter may be 
denied chambers and staff if they are not doing “substantial judicial 
work.”339 As noted previously, the 1944 legislation clarifying the designation 
and assignment requirement was prompted by attention to problems that 
could arise if, as had been reported, judges in senior status sought to 
 
335 Responses to Sept. 1 Letter, supra note 182. 
336 See supra text accompanying note 224. 
337 See supra text accompanying note 269. 
338 See supra text accompanying note 223. 
339 Here, of course, is where transparency about how to meet that standard can serve the 
interests of individual judges. 
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perform judicial services that were not needed, or if there were no prior 
opportunity to coordinate their work with that of judges in regular active 
service.340 
That rationale could justify a refusal to designate and assign predicated 
on considerations of need or the imperatives of logistics. In addition, 
understanding that judges may not be the best judges of their own physical 
and mental limitations, we can accept some latitude for a chief judge, in 
consultation with the circuit judicial council, to rely on the designation and 
assignment power to avoid problems arising from mental or physical 
disabilities that, if not addressed, would otherwise require formal circuit 
judicial council action.341  
That is all a far cry, however, from Judge Posner’s notion that judges in 
senior status serve “essentially at the pleasure of the chief judge and of the 
judicial council of the circuit.”342 Continuation in office provides more than 
a guarantee against diminution of compensation. At the least, it entitles 
judges holding office under Article III, whether in regular active service or 
in senior status, to protection against administrative action that is not firmly 
rooted in institutional needs or in objectively demonstrable disabilities or 
infirmities. In particular, the designation and assignment power cannot 
justify chief judge or council decisions that are influenced by personal 
animosity or political considerations. 
We have raised the question whether a high ratio of judges remaining in 
regular active service or retiring (to authorized judgeships) is evidence of a 
perception of prejudicial treatment of judges in senior status, but we 
understand that there are other possible explanations. We have also raised 
the question whether there is a connection between a culture that disfavors 
en banc proceedings and one that favors assuming senior status promptly 
after eligibility. Given the importance of service in senior status not just to 
the federal judiciary but to the country, we need to understand any such 
connection, as well as the role that current policies and practices play in 
discouraging judges from assuming senior status. 
 
340 See supra text accompanying notes 93-95. 
341 Cf. Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, 
and Judicial Independence under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 25, 136 (1993) (“For a senior judge, the prospect that the chief judge of the circuit might 
refuse to certify the judge as eligible to continue receiving the salary of the office presents an 
equally strong reason to accede.”). 
342 POSNER, supra note 36, at 8. 
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Finally, if we were asked to recommend one relatively simple step that 
would enable the judiciary itself to begin to address the many questions that 
this study has raised, it would be to institute a professionally administered 
exit interview program. Every judge who indicated the intention to resign 
or retire (with or without having first assumed senior status) should be 
asked to participate in an in-depth interview, answering the kinds of 
questions we have found productive in this study, as well as others devel-
oped over time. Interviews could also be conducted of judges who take 
senior status or remain in regular active service for more than three years 
after becoming eligible to assume senior status or retire; if that requirement 
proved too burdensome, a sampling of interviews, perhaps supplemented 
with questionnaires, might suffice. 
Looking ahead, it is vital that the judiciary have reliable information 
about why judges are leaving the bench, or choosing not to. The collection 
of these important data should not depend upon occasional comments to 
newspaper reporters, or the chance interests of researchers. A central 
database built on the best available information is essential to the develop-
ment of sound policies and practices affecting federal judges. We hope that 
this work is a constructive beginning toward that end. 
